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INTRODUCrION
In Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA,' the Fifth Circuit struck down
an EPA regulation on the ground that the cost-benefit justification
was inadequate. The EPA committed a multitude of cost-benefit sins:
discounting costs but not benefits, using inconsistent valuations for
statistical lives, refusing to quantify certain benefits, and refusing to
repeat the analysis with better data supplied by industry. The court
remanded for a more adequate analysis.'
In American Trucking Associations, Inc v EPA,3 the D.C. Circuit
struck down an EPA particulate matter regulation on the ground that
the vague statute authorizing the regulatory activity amounted to an
unconstitutional delegation. The court said that in the next round of
rulemaking the EPA needs to provide a quantitative justification for
the regulation. The court evidently believed that cost-benefit analysis
would be an adequate decision procedure, but precedent barred the
EPA from using that procedure. If the EPA could not come up with an
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1 947 F2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991).
2 Id at 1218-19,1227-30.
3 175 F3d 1027 (DC Cir 1999), revd in part as Whitman v American Trucking Associations,
Inc, 121 S Ct 903 (2001).
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alternative quantitative procedure, it would not be able to regulate
particulate matter pollution unless Congress created a narrower stan-
dard for justifying regulations.'
Although the Supreme Court subsequently rejected the D.C. Cir-
cuit's nondelegation argument, these cases reflect a trend toward
greater recognition of cost-benefit analysis among the circuit courts as
an appropriate and possibly even necessary part of the regulatory
process. This judicial trend parallels developments in other parts of
the federal government, where cost-benefit analysis has taken hold
and expanded in influence.7 But the academic literature has lagged
behind these developments. Although many commentators criticize or
defend cost-benefit analysis as an abstract normative principle, few
look at its role in an institutional context, that is, as a device whose
justification depends on its capacity to help authoritative institutions
such as Congress, the presidency, and the courts monitor subordinate
institutions such as agencies. Yet it was the institutional role of cost-
benefit analysis-as a means to limiting the discretion of agencies-
that concerned the D.C. Circuit.
The article most directly concerned with the institutional aspect
of cost-benefit analysis is Cass Sunstein's evaluation of the emerging
jurisprudence of cost-benefit analysis.0 His approach is pragmatic: he
identifies the standards that courts apply when they review cost-
benefit analyses, and supports them because they are reasonable and
likely to enhance the consistency of regulations. He avoids connecting
his defense of cost-benefit "default rules" to a theoretical justification
of cost-benefit analysis, arguing that cost-benefit analysis is en-
4 American Trucking Associations v EPA, 175 F3d at 1034-40.
5 Whitman v American Trucking Associations, 121 S Ct at 913-14.
6 See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles 18-32, Chicago John M. Olin Law
& Economics Working Paper No 104 (Mar 6, 2001), available online at
<http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=247884> (visited Sept 27,2001).
7 See Douglas Jehl, Regulations Czar Prefers New Path, NY Times sec 1, 1 (Mar 25,2001)
(discussing John Graham's nomination as the administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs as an indication of growing acceptance of cost-benefit analysis).
8 See, for example, Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J
Legal Stud 913 (2000) (defending cost-benefit analysis from a variety of philosophical criticisms);
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J
Legal Stud 1005, 1032-34 (2000) (noting the limits of the use of cost-benefit analysis to answer
certain social questions, such as identifying which basic entitlements a citizen of a state should
possess).
9 See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When
Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J Legal Stud 1105, 1116-25 (2000) (evaluating the ways that agen-
cies modify cost-benefit analysis in order to deal with preferences that are uninformed, adaptive,
morally objectionable, or motivated by moral commitments); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J Legal Stud 1059, 1060-61 (2000) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis
may be justified because its narrow procedures help overcome the cognitive biases of the public
and of administrative officials).
10 Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles (cited in note 6).
1138 [68:1137
2001] Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis 1139
trenched in the government, that the time for defending and criticizing
the decision procedure is past, and that the proper focus is implemen-
tation. U
Sunstein is right about the entrenchment of cost-benefit analysis
in American government. Although President Reagan's .famous 1981
executive order directing regulatory agencies to comply with cost-
benefit analysis was met with a storm of protest,'2 the Democrats did
not reverse this policy when they took control of the presidency in
1993. Instead, President Clinton issued an executive order that en-
dorsed cost-benefit analysis in a slightly modified form." President
George W. Bush to all appearances plans to continue and possibly
strengthen cost-benefit oversight." Meanwhile, the annual number of
cost-benefit reports in the Federal Register has increased about six-
fold since 1980, with no slowdown during the Clinton years." Bills re-
quiring agencies to use cost-benefit analysis have been routinely pro-
posed in Congress since 1995." Some federal regulatory statutes al-ready require it and many more are interpreted to allow it." Finally,
l Robert H. Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U
Chi L Rev 323,323-24 (2001) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis has been generally accepted by
Congress, courts, and the executive and suggesting an approach for implementation).
12 Exec Order No 12291,3 CFR 127,128-29 (1981) (stating that "[r]egulatory action shall
not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the poten-
tial costs to society"). See Marc Granetz, Deregulation Rodeo: Reagan's Rulebusters Get Ready to
Ride, New Republic 9 (Nov 12,1984) (noting the "severe backlash" following the reform efforts);
David Hoffman, Election '84: The Reagan Record, Wash Post A6 (Jan 31, 1984) (noting the "out-
cry" over the Office of Management and Budget reviews for cost-benefit analysis of agency regu-
lation, required by Executive Order 12291).
13 Exec Order No 12866, 3 CFR 638, 639 (1993) (requiring agencies to "assess both the
costs and the benefits of the intended regulation").
14 See Jehl, Regulations Czar Prefers New Path, NY Times at sec 1, 1 (cited in note 7) (not-
ing that President Bush's nomination of John Graham is "a sign that the new administration in-
tends to give more weight to strict cost-benefit tests").
15 Searches on Westlaw in the Federal Register database of "cost /2 benefit," "cost-benefit
[or] benefit-cost," and "cost-benefit analysis [or] benefit-cost analysis" yielded hits of 211, 103,
and 53 for 1980, and 1257, 556, and 378 for 1999. During the same period the total number of an-
nual entries appears to have increased between two and three times (based on neutral search cri-
teria like "household," "mandatory," and "substance"). Accordingly, cost-benefit analysis has be-
come more important both relatively and absolutely.
16 See, for example, Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S 746, 106th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar
25), in 106 Cong Rec S 3481 (ordering that all major rules issued by any agency be subject to a
cost-benefit analysis); Regulatory Reform and Relief Act, HR 926, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 14,
1995) (same); Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S 343, 104th Cong, 1 st Sess (Feb
2), in 104 Cong Rec S 2057 (same).
17 See, for example, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 USC § 136(bb)
(1994 & Supp 1996) (defining "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" as "any unrea-
sonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environ-
mental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide"); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 USC
§ 2605(c) (1994) (requiring EPA administrator to "consider and publish a statement with respect
to the effects of [the] substance on health [and]... the environment, the benefits of such sub-
stance ... for various uses," and "the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the
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cost-benefit analysis has spread from the federal government to the
states.8
But the popularity of cost-benefit analysis is not a sufficient rea-
son for ignoring its theoretical justification. A proper analysis of the
roles of agencies and courts requires both a theory of cost-benefit
analysis and evaluation of judicial and agency practice in light of this
theory.
This Article analyzes cost-benefit analysis as a method by which
the President, Congress, or the judiciary controls agency behavior. It
uses a model from the literature on positive political theory to show
why the President and Congress will often want agencies to perform
cost-benefit analyses. It also uses the model to explore the impact of
cost-benefit analysis on courts and interest groups. The model gener-
ates testable predictions, including the prediction that introduction of
cost-benefit analysis will increase the amount of regulation.
Several arguments emerge from the model. The first argument is
that a common way of justifying cost-benefit analysis-as a decision
procedure that minimizes the sum of error costs and administrative
costs compared to other procedures-is incomplete. The difficulty
with this way of thinking is that the variable, error cost, covers two
very different problems: (1) the problem that even an agency loyal to
the President and Congress may make technical errors, such as dis-
counting the future too much or undervaluing health benefits; (2) the
problem that even an epistemically perfect agency that makes no
technical errors may implement projects that diverge from the goals
of the President and Congress because the agency, or its chief, or its
personnel, have their own divergent goals. The second problem is one
of strategic behavior, and provides a basis for thinking of cost-benefit
analysis as a technique for monitoring and disciplining agencies.
The second argument of this Article is that cost-benefit analysis
may serve a valuable role even if the proper social goal is not effi-
ciency. This point is important, as it resolves puzzles that confront
three radically different perspectives on agency regulation. Cost-
rule, after consideration of the effect on the national economy, small business, technological in-
novation, the environment, and public health"). For cases that interpret statutes to permit cost-
benefit analysis, see Part IV.C. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub L No 104-4,
109 Stat 48, codified at 2 USC §§ 1501-04 (Supp 1996), is the only statute that creates a general
cost-benefit obligation directed to all agencies, but it has had little effect because of exemptions.
See United States General Accounting Office, Unfunded Mandates: Reform Has Had Little Ef-
fect on Agencies' Rulemaking Actions, 3 GAO/GGD-98-30 (1998). There have been efforts in the
other direction, however. See Arthur Fraas, The Role of Economic Analysis in Shaping Environ-
mental Policy, 54 L & Contemp Probs 113, 116-17 (1991) (describing legislation passed in the
late 1980s that limited the use of cost-benefit analysis in environmental statutes).
18 See Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 29 J
Legal Stud 873, 873-74 (2000) (noting that many states have started to require agencies to assess
the economic impact of proposed and existing rules).
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benefit analysis is a puzzle for interest group theory because interest
group theory assumes that the President and Congress seek to trans-
fer resources to interest groups rather than to maximize efficiency."
Cost-benefit analysis is a puzzle for welfare economists because it
does not implement a plausible welfare standard such as the Pareto
principle.2' And cost-benefit analysis is a puzzle for critics from the
left, who point out that it undervalues environmental goods and the
interests of the poor." This Article will show that these puzzles are
solved when cost-benefit analysis is put in the proper institutional
context. The purpose of requiring agencies to perform cost-benefit
analysis is not to ensure that regulations are efficient; it is to ensure
that elected officials maintain power over agency regulation." Evalua-
tion of cost-benefit analysis should be based on its usefulness for dis-
ciplining agencies and enhancing the control of elected officials, not
on its instantiation of ethical principles that elected officials may or
may not share." Many criticisms of cost-benefit analysis confuse the
institutional justification of cost-benefit analysis and the normative
goals of those who elect to use it.
19 See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Introduction, 29 J Legal Stud 837, 839-41
(2000) (noting that, under a government driven entirely by public choice factors, it is hard to
imagine a normative argument in favor of cost-benefit analysis); Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit
Analysis as a Solution to a Principal-Agent Problem, 53 Admin L Rev 289,291 (2001) (discussing
cost-benefit analysis as a device for reducing moral hazard); Gary S. Becker, A Comment on the
Conference on Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J Legal Stud 1149, 1151-52 (2000) (discussing cost-
benefit analysis as it applies in the interest group competition model of political choice).
20 See Robin Boadway and Neil Bruce, Welfare Economics 26-27, 292-328 (Basil Black-
well 1984); I.M.D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics 84 (Oxford 2d ed 1957).
21 See, for example, Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 Reg 33,
35-36,38-40 (Jan-Feb 1981).
22 See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J L, Econ, & Org 243,246 (1987) (arguing that
the purpose of administrative law is not fairness, as is often argued, but that "of helping elected
politicians retain control of policymaking").
23 Many criticisms of cost-benefit analysis miss this point. See, for example, Henry S.
Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J Legal Stud 971,972-73 (2000) (argu-
ing that cost-benefit analysis's "underlying normative standard of choice makes no room for in-
telligent deliberation about how best to use our resources"); Nussbaum, 29 J Legal Stud at 1032-
33 (cited in note 8) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis does not account for questions "that in-
volve serious ethical wrongdoing"); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions,
107 Yale L J 1981, 2042-64 (1998) (noting flaws with cost-benefit analysis, such as an improper
discounting of future lives and the lack of quantifiability of many risks and benefits); David
Copp, The Justice and Rationale of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 23 Theory & Decisions 65,74-77 (1987)
(arguing that cost-benefit analysis incorporates an unacceptable principle of justice, giving
greater weight to the welfare of better-off members of society than the welfare of the poor);
Kelman, 5 Reg at 35-36 (cited in note 21) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis does not consider
the fact that some actions should be undertaken even if the benefits are seemingly less than the
costs). Others who take a moderate view, and argue only that cost-benefit analysis should be
broadened, also neglect the institutional question. See, for example, Amartya Sen, The Discipline
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J Legal Stud 931 (2000).
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The third argument is that the literature on cost-benefit analysis
overlooks the different ways that enforcement of cost-benefit orders
can occur-namely, through political sanctions or through legal sanc-
tions. Political sanctions are punishments inflicted on agencies by the
political principals themselves, including the President disciplining the
agency head, or blocking or delaying the regulation, and Congress en-
acting a statute that reverses the regulation or that reduces the
agency's budget. Legal sanctions are judicial decisions vacating the
regulation. Both approaches are used in the U.S. government, and
each has distinctive implications for the regulatory process.
The plan of the Article is as follows. Part I introduces a model of
the relationship between the President and an agency. This simple au-
diting model shows that cost-benefit analysis can improve the out-
comes of regulatory decisions from the President's perspective even in
the absence of enforcement by the courts. Part II complicates the
model by considering different goals that a president might have; in-
troducing Congress, the courts, and interest groups; and accounting for
cost-benefit analysis's relationship with other devices used by the
President and Congress for disciplining agencies. After a brief discus-
sion of empirical evidence in Part III, Part IV examines the normative
implications of the analysis. It argues among other things that cost-
benefit analysis may be justified as a device for institutional control
even if the standard criticisms of this methodology (for example, that
it undervalues hard-to-measure goods or that it overvalues the inter-
ests of the wealthy) are valid. It also argues that the proper role of the
judiciary is to require agencies to perform cost-benefit analyses com-
petently but not to force agencies to comply with them.
I. MODEL
The best-developed work on the relationship between agencies,
the President, Congress, and the courts can be found in the literature
on positive political theory. The literature treats this relationship as a
principal-agent problem, in which the "principal" -usually Congress, a
congressional committee, a legislative coalition, or the President-.
delegates authority to the "agent," that is, the regulatory agency. Dele-
gation is attractive because the agency can develop expertise and use
this expertise to implement projects that best satisfy the principal's
goals. But delegation has this attractive result only if the agency is
loyal to the principal. The problem with delegation is that the agency
may use its power to pursue its own goals-that is, the goals of the
agency's chief or personnel -rather than the goals of the principal. To
minimize these "agency costs," the principal sets up laws and institu-
tions designed to monitor the agency and then' sanction the agency
when it acts improperly. Well-studied examples include the congres-
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sional committee system and notice and comment rulemaking under
the Administrative Procedure Act.'
A simple way of understanding how cost-benefit analysis changes
the relationship between principals and agencies is to imagine that it
converts a relationship of asymmetric information to one of full in-
formation. Without cost-benefit analysis, the principals are not at a
complete loss, because they can infer that certain projects benefit or
harm them; but they will refuse to consent to other projects that may
or may not make them worse off. With cost-benefit analysis the prin-
cipals now can accept or reject the project on the basis of direct ob-
servation of its consistency with their interests. Understanding cost-
benefit analysis, then, involves comparing a model in which principals
have complete information about the agency's activities and a model
in which they have incomplete information. In both models the agency
can take advantage of its expertise and position to propose new pro-
jects, and the principals can punish an agency that proposes projects
that the principals do not like. All that varies between the two models
is how much information the principals have about the agency's ac-
tions.
The comparison, as we shall see, yields a number of surprising re-
sults. Because agencies retain their agenda-setting power even after
the cost-benefit analysis requirement is imposed on them, the projects
they choose will often fail cost-benefit analysis and nonetheless be
approved by the principals. In addition, because cost-benefit analysis
allows the principals to trust agencies more than when agencies have
an information advantage, there should be more regulation-not
less-after cost-benefit analysis is introduced. Further, cost-benefit
analysis will be desirable even when the principals do not seek effi-
cient outcomes. The reason is that cost-benefit analysis only reduces
the information asymmetry: it remains in the principals' discretion
whether to punish agencies that fail to abide by it. If the principals do
not seek efficient outcomes, they will still find cost-benefit data useful
in determining whether a particular project serves their interests. Fi-
nally, it turns out that the proper role of courts may be to force agen-
cies to conduct good cost-benefit analyses, but not to force agencies to
comply with them.
24 For an overview of this research, see David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating
Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers 18-29
(Cambridge 1999). A critical review by a legal scholar can be found in Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed,
Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law 118-30 (Yale 1997).
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A. What Is Cost-Benefit Analysis?
The Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to describe
the purpose and effect of proposed regulations." The object of this re-
quirement is to facilitate review of regulations by courts and political
superiors. If the agency is forced to explain the purpose of the regula-
tion, then the agency can be criticized if the stated purpose is inconsis-
tent with the statute under which the regulation is issued, or if the
regulation itself is inconsistent with the stated purpose.
The problem with the APA requirement is that verbal descrip-
tions of the purposes and anticipated effects of regulation are inher-
ently ambiguous. Suppose an agency says that a certain regulation
would reduce workers' exposure to a chemical, that this chemical is a
known carcinogen, and that employers would be required to make
certain changes in the workplace. A court cannot determine from this
description whether the regulation is socially beneficial, because the
regulation's social value depends on how much the exposure would be
reduced, how carcinogenic the chemical is, and how costly the work-
place changes would be. Quantification of the benefits by itself does
not solve the problem. Suppose that the agency says that the exposure
will be reduced by a certain amount, that a particular exposure to the
chemical would produce a certain risk of disease or death, or even that
this regulation would reduce mortality by a certain amount. None of
these figures can be used by a court to determine the social value of
the regulation because they do not permit the benefits to be compared
with the costs. And this is true even if the agency estimates the cost to
employers. Suppose the agency said the regulation will reduce lung
cancer by 1 percent and cost employers twenty million dollars. A court
given this information would have great difficulty evaluating the regu-
lation, because the effects of the regulation (reduction of the inci-
dence of disease, increase in costs) are described in terms that are not
comparable.26
Review of a subordinate's decisions is greatly eased when the de-
cision is based on a procedure in which the advantages and disadvan-
tages of a regulation are reduced to a numerical metric. Cost-benefit
analysis is not the only available metric. Others include the use of
quality adjusted life years, in which the alternative regulations are
compared according to how many years of life they save, adjusted for
the "quality" of those years (for example, the health of the person dur-
ing the additional years of life); and risk-risk analysis, in which the
25 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC § 552(a) (1994).
26 For a discussion of the problems with this kind of multidimensional assessment, see Mat-
thew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L J 165, 229-38
(1999).
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regulations are evaluated in terms of the risks they pose. The problem
with these alternatives is that they focus on a narrow range of regula-
tory effects and thus ignore other regulatory effects that people care
about." Life years and risks are not the only things that matter to peo-
ple. People also care about art, entertainment, convenience, and the
quality of the environment. Cost-benefit analysis, by contrast to the
other decision procedures, measures all these things. Among all of the
proposed single-metric or unidimensional decision procedures, cost-
benefit analysis is the one that accounts for the broadest range of wel-
fare effects that a regulation might have.
Cost-benefit analysis is sometimes treated as a loose balancing of
the advantages and disadvantages of a project. But this is not what is
at stake in the policy dispute. The policy dispute concerns the process
by which the welfare effects of projects are determined. When an
agency conducts a cost-benefit analysis, it may spend thousands or
millions of dollars collecting and analyzing data. The data usually
come from studies of market behavior or surveys of consumer prefer-
ences, and the analysis often involves a great deal of extrapolation.
Consider a proposed regulation to require the installation of scrub-
bers in the smokestacks of certain factories. The cost of the regulation
will be calculated from market data on the price of the scrubbers,
which must also take account of potential technological advances that
may reduce that price." The benefit of the regulation will be deter-
mined using scientific studies on the effects of the pollutant on peo-
ple's health and property. Health benefits will be calculated in terms
of reduction of medical costs, and, if lives or life years are saved, in
terms of the value of statistical lives -which themselves are calculated
from studies that determine from market data how much money peo-
ple are willing to pay to avoid small risks of death. If the pollutant
causes damage to the environment, surveys will be used to determine
how much people are willing to pay for clean air, or to preserve wild-
life. The costs and benefits also must be discounted to reflect the pas-
sage of time. And alternative regulations must be considered; for ex-
ample, shutting down the plants or installing another kind of scrubber
may be more cost-effective. When the hard work of data collection
and analysis is completed, the comparison of costs and benefits is
straightforward.
27 See id at 230-31. See also Part II.E.6 for a more thorough discussion of alternatives to
cost-benefit analysis.
28 See Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern, and Peter Nelson, On the Accuracy of
Regulatory Cost Estimates 16-18, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper (Jan 1999), avail-
able online at <http://www.rff.org/disc-papers/199 9 .htm> (visited Sept 27, 2001) (finding that
agencies frequently overestimate costs because of technological innovations).
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Converting this messy procedure into an assumption in a model is
difficult, but there are three reasonable approaches. The first approach
is to assume that an agency can perform an accurate cost-benefit
analysis at no cost, and the agency is incapable of producing a fake
cost-benefit analysis, that is, a cost-benefit analysis that justifies an in-
efficient regulation. The second approach is to assume that cost-
benefit analysis is expensive but accurate. A cost-benefit analysis will
reveal that a regulation is cost-justified or not at a certain cost; to fal-
sify the results, for example, to show that an inefficient regulation is
cost-justified, the cost is higher or infinite. The third approach is to as-
sume that cost-benefit analysis is costly but relatively easy to fake.
Any regulation can be justified with a cost-benefit analysis, but finding
data and making calculations are always costly."
All three assumptions have support in the literature, and no
doubt the truth lies somewhere in between. In some cases data are al-
ready available, studies have been completed, and the cost of compil-
ing these sources and publishing them is trivial compared to the other
administrative costs incurred by the agency. In other cases, data must
be gathered through expensive surveys and studies, but the regulation
affects only goods and services whose values are easy to measure.
When consensus among experts can be achieved because the data are
clear and the procedures are uncontroversial, it would be very expen-
sive- perhaps infinitely expensive-to show that an inefficient regula-
tion is cost-justified. In still other cases the regulation affects the
value of hard-to-measure goods, like environmental amenities, and so
a plausible cost-benefit justification or critique can always be made.
Cost-benefit analysis is expensive because surveys must be conducted
and experts retained, but the intangibles are significant enough to
leave the agency with wide discretion.
It is important to understand the relationship between cost-
benefit analysis, efficiency, and the normative goals of elected officials.
When I say that a project or regulation is "efficient," I mean that it
passes the Kaldor-Hicks standard: the beneficiaries of the project gain
enough that they could overcompensate those who are harmed by the
project. A project that passes a cost-benefit analysis is not necessarily
efficient for several reasons. One is that cost-benefit analysis
monetizes the costs and benefits, whereas Kaldor-Hicks does not, and
29 The fourth possibility-that cost-benefit analysis is cheap and easy to fake-would un-
dermine the argument, but does not seem plausible.
30 See W. Norton Grubb, Dale Whittington, and Michael Humphries, The Ambiguities of
Benefit-Cost Analysis: An Evaluation of Regulatory Impact Analyses under Executive Order
12291, in V. Kerry Smith, ed, Environmental Policy under Reagan's Executive Order: The Role of
Benefit-Cost Analysis 121, 154-59 (North Carolina 1984) (discussing the quality of cost-benefit
analyses from the early 1980s).
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under certain conditions a project whose benefits and costs are
monetized will fail a cost-benefit analysis while passing the Kaldor-
Hicks standard, and vice versa.3 More important, cost-benefit analysis
in the real world unavoidably involves estimates of hard-to-measure
things, like human lives and environmental amenities, so that in prac-
tice a cost-benefit analysis may provide support for inefficient regula-
tions.2 The accuracy of a cost-benefit analysis depends on the condi-
tions under which it is used.
Accordingly, when I say that a project is efficient, I mean that it is
efficient in ordinary conditions, that is, where there are no special
problems of monetization or valuation. But this leads to a further
point, and that is that efficient projects are not necessarily socially de-
sirable ones. For example, projects that redistribute wealth to the poor
are not efficient but may be desirable, and these projects include those
whose redistributive effect are a small component of a larger purpose,
like health regulations that assume that the statistical value of the
lives of the poor is as high as the statistical value of the lives of the
wealthy. Projects that are designed to change people's preferences be-
cause these preferences are distorted or poorly informed will also fre-
quently be inefficient (because efficiency always is measured on the
basis of existing preferences) but socially desirable."
Efficiency, then, is not used in the current inquiry as a normative
criterion but as an analytic concept in a positive analysis. One of the
main points of the argument is that government principals who are in-
terested in goals other than efficiency will in many situations want
agencies to perform cost-benefit analysis, even though cost-benefit
analysis evaluates projects on the basis of efficiency or an approxima-
tion.
B. The Model
We use a model developed by Epstein and O'Halloran to exam-
ine the role of interest groups in congressional oversight 
of agencies.
The model, as reinterpreted for current purposes, involves two charac-
ters: President and Agency. Later we will assign the role of principal to
31 See Robin W. Boadway, The Welfare Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 84 Econ J
926,926-27 (1974).
32 See Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 172-76 (cited in note 26) (giving examples of cost-
benefit analyses in practice that monetized hard-to-measure benefits).
33 See id at 220 (giving the example of a ban on narcotics).
34 David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lob-
byists, and the Bureaucracy, 11 J L, Econ, & Org 227,232-46 (1995). An alternative, equally plau-
sible approach, would hold that the principal can audit the agent at some cost. See Jeffrey S.
Banks and Barry R. Weingast, The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Informa-
tion, 36 Am J Pol Sci 509,512-15 (1992). But this would require a more complex model, and does
not yield different insights.
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Congress and sometimes to general "government principals," that is,
either President or Congress. There are three events: (1) Agency, but
not President, observes the status quo; (2) Agency proposes a project;
and (3) President approves or rejects the project.3" The relevant vari-
ables are depicted in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
LOCATIONS OF THE STATUS Quo AND PARTIES' IDEAL POINTS
-1 w P=O A 1
w = -A
The line extending from -1 to 1 represents the degree to which
there is under- or overregulation along a particular policy dimension,
with w representing the status quo at time 1.31 When w = 0, the effi-
cient level of regulation exists. When w > 0, too much regulation exists.
For example, environmental regulations prevent the production of
goods whose value exceeds the cost of pollution. When w < 0, too little
regulation exists. For example, industry pollution causes significant
harm to health and the environment when pollution control devices
could be installed at low cost. Thus, in Figure 1 the status quo is one of
underregulation.
The letters P and A represent he "ideal points" of President and
Agency. When P = 0, as depicted, President seeks efficient outcomes.
But President may seek outcomes that are inefficient from a cost-
benefit perspective but desirable for other reasons. P < 0 when Presi-
dent values environmental goods less than the average person does;
P > 0 when President values these goods more. For the time being, as-
sume that P = 0. As for Agency, assume that A > P on the assumption
that agencies are generally more interventionist than presidents are.
The players want to minimize the distance between the policy
outcome and their ideal point; they do not care whether the outcome
35 The President does not always have the legal authority to reject a regulation proposed
by an agency. Viscusi notes that OMB has been unable to block regulations that are based on
valuations of statistical lives significantly above the accepted range. W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity,
29 J Legal Stud 843, 854 (2000). But the White House can almost always hold up the regulation
for a period of time. See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for
Risk 265-70 (Oxford 1992) (giving examples drawn mostly from automobile regulations in the
1980s); Thomas 0. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Fed-
eral Bureaucracy 282-88 (Cambridge 1991) (describing delay as one of the ways OMB controls
the substantive policy output of regulations). And, as the Article discusses below, the President
may have other ways of punishing an agency that proposes an undesired regulation. See
Part II.E.
36 The value w is uniformly distributed with mean equal to 0. However, the value of w is
fixed once the game has begun.
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exceeds or falls short. For example, a president with an ideal point of 0
is indifferent between policy outcomes 0.5 and -0.5, and prefers 0.4 (or
-0.4) to either.
At time 1, Agency but not President observes the value of w.
Agency's informational advantage is due to its institutional expertise.
At time 2, Agency proposes a regulation or project. This agenda-
setting power is due to Agency's special legal authority to issue regu-
lations. The regulation is represented by a number r. If r > 0, then the
project increases the amount of regulation. An example is the re-
quirement that scrubbers be used in smokestacks. If r < 0, then the
project reduces the amount of regulation-for example, eliminating
the rule that scrubbers must be used. If r = 0, the status quo does not
change. The outcome of the regulation is simply w + r: the regulation
moves the world along the number line away 
from the status quo.1
At time 3, President approves or rejects the project. Rejection
means that the status quo prevails (w). Acceptance means that the
regulation is implemented (w + r). Because President does not directly
observe w, the decision to accept or reject must be based on infer-
ences from the values of r and A, which President does observe. It
should be mentioned that in reality a president does not have the
power to reverse a project, but may fire the agency head if the agency
is not an independent agency. Part II.E discusses this complication.
Because A # P, Agency and President do not have the same goals,
but neither are their interests completely conflicting. Consider the lo-
cation of w in Figure 1. Both President and Agency prefer a regula-
tion, r > 0, because both seek a more regulated environment. Presi-
dent's ideal regulation is r = -w, for such a regulation would bring the
status quo to 0, President's ideal point. Agency's ideal regulation is
r = -w + A, because this higher value regulation would bring the status
quo to A, Agency's ideal point. Observe that President would be will-
ing to accept a regulation up to r = 2w. The reason is that +w is no
worse for President than -w; each outcome is the same distance from
0. And a similar point can be made about Agency. Each player is will-
ing to accept a range of outcomes superior to the status quo, but their
ideal outcome is just one point within that range.
Finally, it should be observed that the degree to which Agency's
and President's goals converge or diverge depends on the location of
the status quo. We have already seen a case in which their goals par-
tially converge: when w = -A. Their goals diverge when w is, say, A/2.
When w = A/2, Agency benefits only when r > 0, while President bene-
37 Formally, President's utility is Up = -(r + w)2.Agency's utility is UA = -(r + w - A)
2, where
President's ideal point is P = 0, and Agency's ideal point is A > P. Squaring the expressions en-
sures that parties do not attach special importance to whether the policy outcome is negative or
positive; it also creates risk aversion.
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fits only when r < 0. For example, President believes that pollution
controls are too strict, and Agency believes that they are too lax. In
the earlier case, President and Agency believe that pollution controls
are too lax, but Agency wants to strengthen them more than President
does.
C. The Equilibrium without Cost-Benefit Analysis
(Incomplete Information)
Given the assumptions described so far and some technical as-
sumptions that need not detain us,- an equilibrium can be described in
which outcomes are a function of w, A, and P. The equilibrium is rep-
resented graphically as the thick line (not the line of dashes) in Figure
39
38 See Epstein and O'Halloran, 11 J L, Econ, & Org at 248-49 (cited in note 34) (setting
forth formal assumptions needed to solve for equilibrium).
39 The figure is taken from id at 236 fig 2. The complete information equilibrium has been
added to Epstein and O'Halloran's figure. The incomplete information equilibrium was derived
by Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees:






The horizontal axis represents the status quo, w. The vertical axis
represents the value of the regulation, r. The lines labeled A and P
represent he ideal regulations for Agency and President. For example,
when w = -1, Agency's ideal project is r = 1 + A, which produces the
outcome (-1 + 1 + A) = A. The President's ideal project is r = 1, which
produces outcome P = 0. The lines labeled A, and PA represent the
limits of the regulations that Agency would be willing to propose and
that President would be willing to accept. When w = -1, Agency would
be made no worse off by regulation, r = 2 + 2A, which would produce
the outcome 1 + 2A, which is no farther from A than the status quo
(1 + 2A - A = 1 + A = A - (-1)). President would be made no worse off
40 P = 0. The incomplete information equilibrium is represented by the unbroken thick
line. The complete information equilibrium is the same except where the thick line is broken.
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by regulation, r = 2, because +1 is no farther from 0 than is -1. In short,
regulations along A, are the worst (from Agency's perspective) that
Agency would be willing to propose, and regulations along PA are the
worst (from President's perspective) that President would be willing
to approve.
To understand the equilibrium, observe that there are four re-
gions in which the outcome bears a different relationship to the status
quo, w. These are summarized in Table 1. Each row corresponds to one
of the four distinctive regions on the graph in Figure 2.
TABLE 1
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION EQUILIBRIUM REGULATIONS
Row Value of w Value of r Outcome
1 -1 to-3A A - w A
2 -3A to -A 4A A to 3A
3 -A to A 0 -A to A
4 Atol A- w A
Imagine that President desires efficient outcomes (P = 0), and
Agency is the EPA and controlled by liberal but not extreme envi-
ronmentalists. Let's say that A = 0.3. Even though President does not
directly observe w, in some cases President can infer the value of w,
and thus make an informed decision about whether to accept or reject
the project. Suppose, for example, r < 0. Let us say that r = -0.2. Presi-
dent can infer that w = 0.5, and thus will approve the project because
it produces an outcome closer to 0 (namely, 0.3). How does President
make this inference? If w were less than 0.5, say w = 0.4, then Agency
would propose r = -0.1, not r = -0.2. If w were greater than 0.5, then
Agency could do better by proposing a more extreme (negative) pro-
ject. Because Agency's proposal of r = -0.2 is rational only if w = 0.5,
and because under these circumstances the regulation makes Presi-
dent better off, President approves the regulation. Anticipating this,
Agency would be willing to propose the regulation in the first place.
This is like the liberal EPA proposing a deregulatory project because
it believes that existing regulations do more harm than good. A con-
servative President has no reason to doubt the rationale for the regu-
lation. Note that Agency does not choose the best project for Presi-
dent (r = -0.5), but instead uses its agenda-setting power to choose a
regulation that is ideal for itself and good but not ideal for President.
This is the situation in Row 4.
Imagine now that Agency proposes an extremely high-value
regulation of r = 1.3. President can infer that w = -1. The reason is sim-
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ply that given w = -1, r = 1.3 produces an outcome equal to Agency's
ideal of 0.3. President would approve this project because 0.3 is closer
to 0 than -1 is. This is like the liberal EPA proposing an expensive ban
on chlorofluorocarbons because of their great threat to the environ-
ment and human health. The conservative president believes the EPA
because a moderately liberal EPA would not benefit from such an ex-
treme project unless the environmental problem were serious. This is
the situation in Row 1.
The moderately liberal EPA now proposes a low-value project of
r = 0.1. President might fear that w = 0.2, in which case the project
would make President worse off, and for that reason President might
want to reject the project. However, it is also possible that w = -0.2, in
which case President would want to approve the project. Unlike the
cases involving negative value projects and very high-value projects,
President cannot infer the value of w, and so will assume that it equals
its average over the range of value of w for which r does not reveal the
location of w, namely 0. But if w = 0, which is President's ideal point,
any project would make President worse off. Accordingly, President
rejects low-value projects. Anticipating these rejections, Agency does
not propose these projects in the first place. This is the situation in
Row 3."
Finally, for a range of values of w, Agency can provide limited
information to President about the status quo by proposing
regulations that are higher valued than Agency's ideal. In Row 2,
r = 1.2 (4 - 0.3) when -0.9 < w < -0.3. To see why this is an equilibrium,
observe that when Agency proposes r = 1.2, President knows that w is
on average -0.6.2 President approves the regulation because r + w is
no farther from P = 0 than w is. Given that President will approve this
regulation, Agency has an incentive to propose it. If w = -0.8, the
outcome is 0.4. The reason that Agency cannot propose the superior
(for both President and Agency) regulation of r = 1.1 is that if
President approved such regulations -that is, if President approved
any regulation r, regardless of how low r is -then Agency would be
able to propose and obtain approval for (for example) r = 0.5 when
w = -0.2.
41 This is like the lemons equilibrium: because of incomplete information it is impossible to
"trade," that is, agree on a project that would make both parties better off, when -0.3 < w < 0. See
George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q J Econ 488 (1970) (describing the lemons model in which jointly desirable sales of certain
goods and services are not possible because of information asymmetries between seller and
buyer).
42 This figure is the average value of w given that -0.9 < w < -0.3 and w is chosen from a
uniform distribution.
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This latter regulation makes President worse off than in the status
quo. Agency cannot issue a regulation 0 < r < 1.2, because on average
such regulations will make President worse off given that President
assumes that w = -0.6 when it is not the case that r > 1.2 (w < -0.9) or
r < 0 (w > 0.3). Row 2 contains the cases in which Agency overregu-
lates in order to persuade President that there is a serious problem.
The last point is that A could be higher or lower than 0.3. When A
is close to 0, President and Agency have similar interests. When A is
close to 1, President and Agency have very different interests. When
their interests converge, President knows that Agency will propose
projects that President likes. Rows 1 and 4 expand to cover nearly all
the cases. Most projects will be approved, and few will be distorted by
signaling. When their interests diverge, President cannot trust Agency
except in cases of negative value regulations or high value positive
regulations. Rows 2 and 3 expand to cover nearly all the cases. Few
projects will be approved, and those that are will usually be distorted
by signaling.
From President's perspective, three things are preventing Agency
from making optimal choices. First, the divergence between Agency's
interests and President's interests causes Agency to prefer different
projects. Second, Agency's agenda-setting power-which results from
its ability to move first and make a take-it-or-leave-it offer-enables it
to choose nonideal projects for President even when President can in-
fer the value of w. Third, incomplete information prevents some mu-
tually beneficial projects from being proposed, and causes Agency to
distort other beneficial projects in the direction of greater-than-
necessary regulation.
D. The Equilibrium with Cost-Benefit Analysis (Full Information)
Now let us introduce cost-benefit analysis, which is initially con-
ceived to be costless and perfectly accurate. Agency can, without ex-
pending any resources, produce a cost-benefit analysis, which will be
understood as a statement about whether r = -w. If r = -w, the project
passes; otherwise the project fails.4 This follows from our assumption
that the efficient outcome is 0 on the policy line. For now, assume that
Agency is obligated to produce the cost-benefit analysis, perhaps on
the theory that if it does not, it will be punished by President."5
43 This is true even when P 0. The argument assumes for expository convenience (but
does not depend on) President seeking efficient outcomes.
44 An alternative assumption is that the cost-benefit analysis reveals only whether the pro-
ject improves the status quo in the direction of efficiency; that is whether Iw+r < JIw.
45 The Article returns to this issue in Parts I.E, I.F, and I.G.
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These assumptions transform the incomplete information game
described above into a full information game. For many values of w,
the equilibrium project with cost-benefit analysis is the same as the
equilibrium project with incomplete information. But for a range of
values, the equilibria diverge. In Figure 2, the thick line of dashes
represents the outcomes for which the complete information equilib-
rium diverges from the incomplete information equilibrium. Other-
wise, the equilibria are the same (note the thick unbroken line). The
two equilibria are also compared in Table 2.""
TABLE 2
INCOMPLETE AND COMPLETE INFORMATION
EQUILIBRIUM REGULATIONS
Row Value Value of r Value of r Difference Difference
of w (incomplete (full info) for for
info) Agency President
1 -lto-3A A-w A- w 0 0
2 -3Ato-A 4A A- w 3A+ w 3A+ w
3 -A to 0 0 -2w 2w 0
4 0 toA 0 0 0 0
5 Atol A- w A- w 0 0
In comparing the complete and incomplete information equilib-
ria, notice that there is no change in Rows 1 and 5.47 The reason is that
when w is high or low enough, Agency's proposal of a high (positive or
negative) value project reveals the location of w. Because President
has full information (although this is endogenous rather than the re-
sult of the cost-benefit analysis), a cost-benefit analysis cannot reveal
additional information to President, and thus will not change behav-
ior. For example, imagine that A = 0.3, and Agency proposes a project
r = 1.3. President knows that w = -1 for the reasons given in Part II.C.
Accordingly, a cost-benefit analysis that revealed that w = -1 would
not give President new information, and thus would not change
behavior in equilibrium.
Also notice that there is no change in Row 4. Suppose that
A = 0.3 and w = 0.1. Agency can improve its utility only by choosing r
46 The description of the complete information equilibrium is taken from Epstein and
O'Halloran, 11 J L, Econ, & Org at 234-36 (cited in note 34); it was derived originally by Thomas
Romer and Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agencies, and the Status
Quo, 33 Pub Choice 27,29-35 (1978).
47 A fifth row has been added to the table because the full information equilibrium has an
extra partition between -A and A.
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> 0, but any r > 0 would move the outcome farther from President's
ideal point of 0. With full information, President will not approve any
project that Agency would want to propose. With incomplete informa-
tion, the similar result has a slightly different reason. President knows
that any low-value project, given a relatively high A, might make
President worse off, and accordingly rejects any low-value project. The
region of rejection is larger in the incomplete information case (Rows
3 and 4) because President's uncertainty leads to rejection of projects
that on average make President worse off. With full information, the
subset of projects that in fact make President better off are approved.
Continuing with Row 3, it is necessary to explain why with com-
plete information Agency proposes r = -2w (which is greater than 0,
given that w is negative), rather than r = A - w. The reason is that if
-A _< w 0, President would reject Agency's ideal project, r = A - w,
because such a project would produce an outcome farther from 0 (but
positive rather than negative) than w.4 If A = 0.5, and w = -0.2, Presi-
dent would not approve r = A - w = 0.7, because the resulting out-
come, 0.5, is farther from 0 than is -0.2. President would approve at
most r = -2w = 0.4, because the resulting outcome, 0.2, is no farther
from 0 than the status quo of -0.2. President and Agency both benefit
from a project, r > 0, when w is close to, but less than, 0. President will
not, however, approve a project of such high value that it implements
A if A is worse for President han the status quo.
Row 2 concerns the case where, in the incomplete information
model, Agency signals to President that w is relatively low by imple-
menting a higher than ideal (from Agency's perspective) project. With
complete information, signaling is no longer necessary. When w < -A,
President will approve Agency's best project, A - w. This project will
result in outcome A, which is of course closer to President's ideal
point, 0, than a status quo that is lower than -A. The reasoning is the
same as it was for Row 1.
The comparison of the two equilibria yields a number of insights.
As one would expect, introduction of cost-benefit analysis results in
better projects from the perspective of President and of social wel-
fare.9 However, even with full information, Agency can exploit its bar-
gaining power-that is, its power to propose a project, which President
can only accept or reject-and it will do so by biasing most projects in
48 For example, for w - A/2, Agency's ideal project, r = (3/2)A, would give President utility
of -A 2, whereas the status quo gives President utility of -A'/4. See note 37 for the definition of
President's utility function. To avoid rejection, Agency must propose a project that President is
willing to accept, namely, r = -2w. In the example, project r = -2w yields presidential utility
U, = -A'/4, which is no worse than the status quo.
49 President benefits from cost-benefit analysis even when P i 0, that is, even when Presi-
dent does not care about efficiency. See note 37.
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favor of greater regulation. In other words (see Row 3), introduction
of cost-benefit analysis will result in the approval of some projects
that fail cost-benefit analysis.
Another insight is that the introduction of cost-benefit analysis
will result in more regulation but less extreme regulation (see Rows 2
and 3). The reason is that without cost-benefit analysis President can-
not trust the agency much. A President who does not trust Agency will
reject low-value projects, and thus Agency has no incentive to propose
them in the first place. In a moderate range, Agency will propose more
aggressive projects than even it wants, as a way to signal to President
that the status quo is bad. Introducing cost-benefit analysis enables
President to trust Agency more, so more regulation will occur. But be-
cause signaling is no longer necessary, the regulation will exhibit less
variance. Both President and Agency are made better off, and Agency
more so than President because of its bargaining power.
This result can be seen in Figure 3, in which outcomes rather than
project values are indexed on the y-axis. President wants a horizontal
line along the x-axis, which is also the efficient outcome. Agency wants
a horizontal line at A. The complete information equilibria are on av-
erage closer to A and to P = 0 than the incomplete information equi-
libria, but the complete information equilibria, like the incomplete in-
formation equilibria, are on average closer to A than to P.0 One can
see that regulation with cost-benefit analysis occurs for more values of
w - that is, for more states of the world - and that the regulation is less
extreme.
50 It is also more likely that agencies will be created when cost-benefit analysis is an avail-
able tool than when it is not. The reason that cost-benefit analysis leads to more regulation
and/or more agencies is that the President and Congress can trust agencies to engage in less rent
extraction, and to choose projects closer to their ideal points. There is a related point much dis-
cussed in the literature. When politicians can exert greater control over agencies, they are more
likely to create agencies in the first place. Inability to control agencies-for example, because the
agencies do not affect organized interest groups that will inform politicians when the agencies go
astray-results in fewer agencies than would exist in a world with lower monitoring costs.
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Although the analysis is still at a preliminary stage, it should be
clear that cost-benefit analysis should not necessarily be objectionable
to agencies or even to proregulation interest groups like environ-
mental organizations. The reason is that when the President cannot
determine what an agency is doing, the likely response is not to give it
free rein but, on the contrary, to rein it in. An agency and its support-
ers might prefer a world in which the President lets it do whatever it
wants, but that is not an option. Given the choice between submitting
to cost-benefit analysis and losing the President's support, the agency
and its interest groups will prefer the former. That cost-benefit analy-
sis improves outcomes for both the agency and the President is clear
from Table 2 and Figure 3. That may be why, despite many complaints,
cost-benefit analysis has persisted as a major instrument of regulation.
E. Endogenizing Cost-Benefit Analysis
The analysis so far takes a shortcut by assuming that cost-benefit
analysis transforms an incomplete information game into a complete
information game, rather than directly modeling the agency's use of
cost-benefit analysis. This was done for expository clarity. Allowing the
agency to choose cost-benefit analysis does not change the results
51 Outcomes are on the y-axis; status quo values are on the x-axis. The nondotted line
represents incomplete information equilibria; the dotted line represents values where complete
information equilibria diverge from incomplete information equilibria.
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much, although it discloses a new puzzle about why agencies need to
be ordered to perform and report cost-benefit analyses rather than
being willing to do so on their own.
Imagine that Agency has the option of issuing a cost-benefit
analysis at the same time that it proposes a project. Let us suppose
that cost-benefit analysis does not cost zero, but does have some small
cost k which is invariant with respect to the efficiency of the project.2
President may, as before, accept or reject the project. Initially, observe
that Agency has no incentive to issue the cost-benefit analysis when
w < -3A and when w > A. In these regions the negative or high posi-
tive value of r, along with knowledge of the value of A, enables Presi-
dent to infer the value of w. Issuing a cost-benefit analysis thus would
be costly, but it would not reveal any information. President has no
incentive to demand the cost-benefit analysis-that is, threaten to
reject any project that is not accompanied by a cost-benefit analysis-
because in these regions President does better as a result of the pro-
ject than in the status quo. In addition, the outcome does not change
when 0 < w < A, the region in which President and Agency cannot
both be benefited by a project because they have conflicting interests.
With or without cost-benefit analysis, even with k = 0, Agency could
not issue a project that benefits itself and that President would ap-
prove.
When -3A < w < A, Agency's use of a high-value project (r = 4A)
results in outcomes that are higher than both President and Agency
want. If k is sufficiently small, Agency would perform and report the
cost-benefit analysis voluntarily, and President would approve the pro-
ject. Suppose, for example, that w = -2A. Without cost-benefit analysis,
the project is r = 4A, and the outcome is 2A. With cost-benefit analysis,
Agency could choose project r = 3A, in which case the outcome, A, is
the same as Agency's ideal point and closer by A to President's ideal
point of 0. Given the assumption that k is small, Agency would volun-
tarily issue the cost-benefit analysis.
The same argument can be made about the region in which
-A < w < 0. Incomplete information prevents Agency from issuing a
project that makes both Agency and President better off. If k is low
enough, Agency can issue the same project with a cost-benefit analysis,
and President will approve it. The only difference between this case
and the previous case is that in this case, starting at -A, President will
no longer accept projects greater than -2w, and accordingly Agent's
projects will be no higher than -2w.
The argument so far reproduces the earlier analysis in which cost-
benefit analysis converted an incomplete information game into a full
52 The Article elaborates on this assumption in Part I.F (the blunt signal theory).
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information game, except that it makes more explicit the choice of
whether to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. If k is sufficiently small, the
equilibria are exactly the same. What we learn from endogenizing
cost-benefit analysis is that (1) sometimes Agency will not issue a cost-
benefit analysis, but in these cases its failure to do so is justified be-
cause the project value itself gives President complete information;
and (2) otherwise Agency will issue a cost-benefit analysis voluntarily,
without needing to be compelled by President. These two points pro-
voke reflection, for they suggest that the Reagan and Clinton execu-
tive orders were unnecessary. Presidents gain nothing from cost-
benefit analyses when agencies would not otherwise be inclined to
perform them, and when presidents benefit from cost-benefit analyses,
agencies have the right incentives to perform them without being
prodded.
F. Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Precise or Blunt Signal
Cost-benefit analysis was assumed to be costless (or nearly cost-
less) and perfect, but other assumptions are plausible. One alternative
assumption is that cost-benefit analysis is costly and inaccurate (a
"blunt signal"). Another assumption is that cost-benefit analysis is
costly and precise: any cost-benefit analysis costs some amount, k, but
k increases with the inefficiency of the regulation (a "precise signal").3
The preceding section considered the blunt signal case when the
cost of the signal, k, is insignificant. As k increases, the analysis
changes. The most interesting difference is that the agency can now
signal by issuing an uninformative cost-benefit analysis5 rather than
by issuing a high-value regulation. Consider the case where w = -2A,
and the equilibrium project in the incomplete information version of
the game is r = 4A, resulting in an outcome of 2A. Recall that Agency
issues this high-value project in order to persuade President that w
equals -2A rather than a number closer to 0. A large expenditure on a
cost-benefit analysis-one that results in the inability of Agency to
implement other projects that it values-could similarly persuade
President that w is far from 0. For if it were close to 0, Agency would
not gain enough from the project to justify the expenditure of k. If this
is right, then Agency would be able to issue a lower value regulation
53 Compare Scott Ainsworth, Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence, 55 J Pol
41, 51-52 (1993), who models the influence of lobbyists on legislatures. Costly lobbying is a signal
that may distinguish lobbyists who care more or care less about an issue. By contrast, the model
assumes that the agency sends the signal, and although the signal may reveal how much the
agency cares, this means the location of w, not the location of A.
54 An example of a blunt signal is a cost-benefit analysis that relies on expensive but unre-
liable contingent valuation surveys. For criticism of this method, see the essays in Ian J. Bateman
and Kenneth G. Willis, eds, Valuing Environmental Preferences (Oxford 1999).
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like r = 3A, and this regulation would be better for both Agency and
President. What is interesting about this argument is that the cost-
benefit analysis might not distort political outcomes as much as the
high-value regulation. Society would rather Agency persuade Presi-
dent that air pollution is a problem by issuing an expensive but mean-
ingless cost-benefit analysis than by forcing factories to install scrub-
bers that are more expensive than necessary.5
Under the precise signal theory, k is a decreasing function of the
efficiency of the project. To simplify, suppose that k = 0 when r = -w
and k is otherwise some high cost k " which we interpret as the cost of
"faking" a plausible cost-benefit analysis. For example, if w = -2A,
Agency can either issue efficient project r = 2A and pay k = 0, or issue
inefficient but Agency-ideal project r = 3A and pay k' If President be-
lieves any cost-benefit analysis, then Agency will choose r = 2A if
-(2A -2A -A) 2 > -(3A - 2A - A) 2 - k" that is, k'> A 2. President will
believe a cost-benefit analysis only if this inequality is met.6 The ine-
quality shows that the more Agency's goal diverges from President's,
the more effective the cost-benefit analysis must be in distinguishing
efficient and inefficient projects. If the inequality is not met, President
will not believe the cost-benefit analysis, Agency will not bother to en-
gage in it, and the incomplete information outcome will result.
Outcomes under the precise signal theory are not always better
than outcomes in the original model. As before, Agency will not
always issue a cost-benefit analysis if w > 0 or w < -3A. In these
regions the high value of the project itself reveals sufficient
information or (when 0 < w < A) Agency and President cannot both
benefit from the same project.
There is an important difference between the original model and
the precise signal theory. In the original model Agency has no incen-
tive to choose efficient projects if President's ideal point is far from ef-
ficiency." In the precise signal model, this is no longer true. Because
the cost-benefit analysis is cheaper if the regulation is efficient than if
it is inefficient, Agency has a new incentive to issue efficient regula-
tions: the incentive to minimize expenses, thus preserving funds for
other projects. If cost-benefit analysis is a precise signal, Agency's
regulations will be biased in the direction of efficiency.
55 Compare Pablo T. Spiller and Emerson H. Tiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic Design
of Administrative Process and Judicial Review, 26 J Legal Stud 347,361-62 (1997), in which cost-
benefit analysis is a decision cost imposed on the agency.
56 The left side of the inequality is Agency's utility from issuing the efficient regulation:
-(r + w - A)' - k, where r = 2A and k = 0. See note 37. The right side is Agency's utility from issu-
ing the Agency's best regulation along with the fake cost-benefit analysis: -(r + w - A)'- k
where r = 3A and k'> 0.
57 This fact-that under the original model President benefits from cost-benefit analysis
even when P i 0-is discussed in Part H.A.
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It is clear that this bias benefits a President whose ideal point is
close to efficiency. But it also benefits a President whose ideal point is
less interventionist than efficiency and a President whose ideal point is
more interventionist than efficiency but closer to 0 than to A. The
anti-intervention President benefits because all regulations are lower
value than they would otherwise be. The President whose ideal point
is positive but close to 0 benefits because regulations will tend to pro-
duce outcomes closer to 0 than to A. It is only the relatively pro-
intervention President who would not benefit from cost-benefit analy-
sis if the precise signal model is correct.
In sum, cost-benefit analysis improves policy outcomes for Presi-
dent and Agency in a range of plausible circumstances. The only cases
in which it does not are when: (a) cost-benefit analysis is a blunt signal
that is also very expensive; or (b) cost-benefit analysis is a precise sig-
nal and President is sufficiently more interventionist than efficiency
requires. As in the original model, Presidents who do not care strongly
about efficiency may benefit from obliging Agency to perform cost-
benefit analyses.
However, we still have not solved the puzzle described in the
previous section, namely, why President would need to order Agency
to perform cost-benefit analysis. Agency would do it on its own if the
procedure has the benefits that have been described. For while cost-
benefit analysis is expensive, it improves the probability that the regu-
lation will be approved. Further, if President does order Agency to
engage in cost-benefit analysis, that should not change equilibrium
behavior. President has no way-in the model-to punish Agency if it
does not comply. These last implications are examined in the next sec-
tion.
G. Dynamic Considerations
One might argue that the static nature of the game conceals
President's ability to sanction agencies that fail to issue plausible cost-
benefit analyses. Consider a dynamic version of the game, in which the
three periods are repeated indefinitely. One might think that in such a
game President would threaten to reject all projects, or some large
number of projects, after Agency fails to issue a cost-benefit analysis
or a plausible cost-benefit analysis. It is well-known that in infinitely
repeated games such a threat could be credible.'
This argument, however, makes no sense in the game under con-
sideration. Recall that when Agency does not want to issue a cost-
benefit analysis, President would not want Agency to issue a cost-
58 See Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory 123-29
(Blackwell 2d ed 1989) (discussing equilibria in infinitely repeated games).
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benefit analysis. And when a cost-benefit analysis benefits President,
Agency has every incentive to supply one. There is simply no need for
President to order agencies to issue cost-benefit analyses, to threaten
agencies with punishment if they fail to issue cost-benefit analyses, or
to punish agencies that fail to issue cost-benefit analyses.59
Then how does the model explain the Reagan and Clinton execu-
tive orders? The most plausible explanation is that these orders had
no more than a marginal effect on the behavior of agencies, 6 and that
the executive orders were exercises in public relations or symbolic
politics. As I will argue below, there is no evidence that regulations is-
sued under these executive orders were more efficient than those is-
sued before them. Further, many if not most of the regulations issued
under these orders have been accompanied by cost-benefit analyses of
dubious value and were approved nonetheless.6 The executive orders
probably did stimulate coordination among the agencies, a greater so-
phistication in the use of cost-benefit analysis, and some academic re-
search on valuation methodologies. The executive orders may have, in
these ways, led to a reduction in the cost of cost-benefit analysis and
an enhancement of its accuracy. Cost-benefit analysis in the 1970s was
not a sophisticated methodology and the agencies, in the absence of
some hint from the President, probably doubted that it could help
them get regulations approved, especially in an atmosphere in which
regulation was considered more urgent than it is today. Agencies
probably also feared that because cost-benefit analysis always relies
on contestable assumptions, use of this methodology would hand crit-
ics ammunition for holding up the regulation in court. What agencies
needed, but what they did not get until the 1980s and 1990s, was cen-
trally organized coordination and instruction. If cost-benefit analysis
could be made cheaper and more reliable, it would become more at-
tractive as a tool for justifying regulation.
II. COMPLICATIONS
A. The President's Maximand
This Article has generally assumed that the President seeks effi-
cient outcomes, although this assumption has already been relaxed in
the section on costly signals. This section discusses in more detail the
59 Indeed, the EPA did publish cost-benefit analyses, or loose approximations thereof, be-
ginning in 1970. By 1979 it had produced 427 "economic analyses." Richard N.L. Andrews, Eco-
nomics and Environmental Decisions, Past and Present, in Smith, ed, Environmental Policy under
Reagan's Executive Order at 43,56 (cited in note 30).
60 Id (noting that several agencies conducted cost-benefit analyses before they were re-
quired to do so by any presidential order).
61 See text accompanying notes 111-21.
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case in which the President does not seek efficient outcomes but seeks
to maximize the probability of reelection and does so by making
transfers to various interest groups and constituents.
One might think that if the President does not care about effi-
ciency, then cost-benefit analysis could play no useful role. The Presi-
dent would not benefit from knowing that an agency's proposal is
cost-justified. The relevant information would be whether that pro-
posal benefits the President's constituents. It turns out that this intui-
tion is wrong.
As an example, consider Figure 4, in which E represents the effi-
cient policy. P remains the President's ideal point, represented as 0,
but now assumed to be more interventionist than efficiency requires.
FIGURE 4
AN INTERVENTIONIST PRESIDENT
-1 w E P=O A 1
Suppose w = -2A. The earlier analysis shows that with incomplete
information, Agency will choose r = 4A, resulting in outcome 2A. Now
introduce cost-benefit analysis. The efficient project would be
r = E - w, resulting in outcome E. However, Agency and President
would prefer a higher value project, for such a project would move the
outcome closer to Agency's and President's ideal points. Agency
would in fact choose r = (A - w) = 3A, resulting in outcome A. Be-
cause A is closer to 0 (President's ideal point) than 2A, cost-benefit
analysis makes President better off. But it does not result in an effi-
cient project-the project would fail the cost-benefit analysis.
Why would an efficiency-indifferent President order agencies to
conduct cost-benefit analysis? The answer is that the cost-benefit
analysis yields valuable information that President can use in deciding
whether to approve or reject Agency's regulation. It is important to
see that the cost-benefit analysis is just a device for analyzing and re-
porting information; it does not compel any particular regulatory re-
sponse unless President or some other authority is committed to pun-
ishing an agency that implements cost-unjustified projects. The addi-
tional information benefits President regardless of whether Presi-
dent's ideal point is the same as efficiency, and the reason is that addi-
tional information is a good thing to have, regardless of one's goals.
This is why both a relatively anti-environment president such as
Reagan and a relatively pro-environment president such as Clinton
would order agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis. Both benefited
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from the additional information, even if each would have used it dif-
ferently.
The results change if cost-benefit analysis is enforced by courts
rather than by the President or another political actor like Congress.
This is the topic of the next section.
B. The Role of the Courts
An issue that is neglected in the literature on cost-benefit analysis
is whether this instrument is enforced by political sanctions or by legal
sanctions. To understand this distinction, consider the different ap-
proaches of two bills, proposed in the Senate, one in 1995 and the
other in 1999. The 1995 Senate bill states:
(a) No final rule ... shall be promulgated unless the agency finds
that-
(1) the potential benefits to society from the rule outweigh the
potential costs of the rule to society ...
(b) The requirements of this section shall supplement the deci-
sional criteria for rulemaking otherwise applicable under the
statute granting the rulemaking authority, except when such stat-
ute contains explicit textual language prohibiting the considera-
tion of the criteria set forth in this section. '
In addition, the bill provides that courts "shall set aside agency
action that fails to satisfy the decisional criteria of [the section ex-
cerpted above]."""
The 1999 Senate bill states:
If the agency head determines that the rule is not likely to pro-
vide benefits that justify the costs of the rule or is not likely to
substantially achieve the rule making objective in a more cost-
effective manner, or with greater net benefits, than the other rea-
sonable alternatives considered by the agency, the agency head
shall -
62 To be sure, a president whose constituents have particular non-efficiency goals will want
to have information different from the results of a cost-benefit analysis. For example, a president
who simply wants to increase longevity because of the pressure of an interest group may be satis-
fied with information about longevity and not need it to be converted into a monetary valuation,
and further would not need to know the costs of the regulation. But in the usual situation, the
President will want both the cost-benefit analysis and an accounting that identifies effects of
concern to supporters and interest groups.
63 Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S 343 § 623.
64 Id § 624(d).
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(A) explain the reasons for selecting the rule notwithstanding
such determination, including identifying any statutory provision
that required the agency to select such rule;
(B) describe any reasonable alternative considered by the agency
that would be likely to provide benefits that justify the costs of
the rule and be likely to substantially achieve the rule making ob-
jective in a more cost-effective manner, or with greater net bene-
fits, than the alternative selected by the agency; and
(C) describe any flexible regulatory option considered by the
agency and explain why that option was not adopted by the
agency if the option was not adopted."
In addition, the 1999 bill provides that courts shall not review the
regulations solely on the basis of the regulations' satisfaction of the
cost-benefit analysis, but may treat the latter as relevant for overall
review of the rule.-
The bills differ along two dimensions. The 1995 bill requires the
agency to comply with cost-benefit analysis and backs up this re-
quirement with judicial review. The 1999 bill requires the agency only
to report the results of the cost-benefit analysis-not comply with
them-and softens judicial review. The Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995 provides still another combination: it requires agencies to
comply with the results of their cost-benefit analyses but eliminates
judicial review.7 But what is important for our purposes are the differ-
ent provisions for judicial review. The bills and the statute show that
Congress can either rely on courts to compel cost-benefit analysis, or
it can choose not to and instead allow the political branches to punish
agencies that fail to use cost-benefit analysis.
The Reagan and Clinton executive orders are both similar to the
1999 bill. Although the Reagan executive order requires agencies to
comply with their cost-benefit analyses, it does not authorize courts to
reverse regulations that violate cost-benefit analysis.8 The Clinton ex-
ecutive order does not even require agencies to comply with their
cost-benefit analyses. Rather, it requires them to conduct cost-benefit
analysis and report the results." But as a practical matter the two ex-ecutive orders have the same effect. They order agencies to engage in
65 Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S 746 § 623(d)(2).
66 Id § 627(d).
67 2 USC §§ 1532,1571 (Supp 1998).
68 Exec Order No 12291 § 9, 3 CFR at 133-34 (stating that the order "is not intended to
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law").
69 Exec Order No 12866 § 6(a)(3)(B)-(C),3 CFR at 645-46.
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cost-benefit analysis but leave sanctions to the executive branch to
impose on noncomplying agencies if it wishes.
It is thus clear that elected officials understood that cost-benefit
analysis can be enforced in two different ways: by political sanctions
and by legal sanctions. What is the difference between these two ap-
proaches?
Political sanctions enable Congress and the President to retain
control over the agency's incentives. In the simple model, President's
political sanction is to reverse Agency's project. This means that an in-
efficiency-minded President will approve a regulation that is ineffi-
cient but beneficial to President. When cost-benefit analysis is en-
forced by political sanctions, it does not cause agencies to act effi-
ciently; it causes them to issue regulations closer to President's ideal
point, whatever it is, than the regulations the agencies would issue un-
der incomplete information.
Judicial sanctions, which transfer control of the agency's incen-
tives from the political branches to the judicial branch, introduce new
issues. Courts have their own ideal points, and these are not necessar-
ily the same as efficiency."0 If a court's ideal point is sufficiently close
to President's or Congress's, or if a court enforces the law rather than
its own ideological goals, then the introduction of judicial preferences
does not present any special problems to the analysis. Otherwise, the
analysis becomes complex.71
Let us stick with the simpler premise and suppose that a court
seeks to enforce the law. If the court had perfect information, it would
vacate all regulations that are not efficient, that is, that do not achieve
policy outcome E. In this simple case, judicial enforcement aids the
government to the extent that the government's ideal point approxi-
mates efficiency. There is a twist, however. Agency will not propose
projects when 0 < w < 2A, because the efficient project (r = -w) would
make Agency worse off or (in the case of w = 2A, in which case the ef-
ficient project is r = -2A) no better off. Judicial enforcement of cost-
70 For models that explore the influence of judicial ideology on political outcomes, see
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va L Rev 1717
(1997) (analyzing judicial decisions in terms of, among other things, the party of the president
who nominated the judge); Pablo T. Spiller and Matthew L. Spitzer, Where Is the Sin in Sincere?:
Sophisticated Manipulation of Sincere Judicial Voters (with Applications to Other Voting Envi-
ronments), 11 J L, Econ, & Org 32, 36-51 (1995) (discussing how political ideology of the judge
can affect political outcomes). See also Spiller and Tiller, 26 J Legal Stud at 348-59 (cited in note
55) (recognizing judicial policy preferences as a component of judicial decisionmaking).
71 For a model that treats the court as a political actor, see Spiller and Tiller, 26 J Legal
Stud at 348-59 (cited in note 55); Emerson H. Tiller, Controlling Policy by Controlling Process:
Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision Making, 14 J L, Econ, & Org 114 (1998) (analyzing
procedural mechanisms courts use to control agency action and effectuate their own policy pref-
erences).
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benefit analysis does not ensure efficient outcomes when agencies re-
tain discretion not to issue regulations.1
2
Because courts have imperfect information, agencies have more
room to maneuver. If, to take the extreme, courts had no information,
they would be in the same position as President in the original incom-
plete information model. The difference is that presidents approve
projects that make them at least as well off as the status quo, whereas
the model assumes that courts approve only those projects that are ef-
ficient. As a result, outcomes would be closer to efficiency although
signaling would still occur. If w = -1, for example, Agency could no
longer issue regulation r = 1 + A, because the court would infer that
w = -1, conclude that the outcome is greater than E < 0, and strike
down the regulation. For high and low w's, Agency would issue
r = -w + E rather than r = -w + A. Signaling would continue to occur in
the lower middle range but the outcomes would still be closer to 0
than in the absence of cost-benefit analysis.3
Judicial enforcement of cost-benefit analysis under incomplete
information clearly benefits efficiency-minded presidents. What is
more surprising is that it may benefit anti-efficiency presidents as well.
Consider Figure 4, again, and suppose that E = -A/2. Observe that the
anti-efficiency President (P > E) does better if Agency issues regula-
tion r-= -w + E (which produces outcome E), than if Agency is subject
to cost-benefit analysis enforced by political sanctions and issues regu-
lation r = 3A (the complete information result, producing outcome A)
and if Agency is not subject to cost-benefit analysis at all and issues
regulation r = 4A (the incomplete information result, producing out-
come 2A). Presidents who are not much more interventionist than ef-
ficiency or, it turns out, are less interventionist than efficiency, prefer
judicial enforcement to political enforcement." The stronger judicial
sanction compensates for the distance between the judicial outcome
and President's ideal point.
To summarize: given a status quo of incomplete information
when cost-benefit analysis is introduced and enforced by political
72 Unless citizens can sue agencies for failing to act. See National Customs Brokers & For-
warders Association of America, Inc v United States, 883 F2d 93, 96 (DC Cir 1989) (noting that
"refusals to institute rulemaking proceedings ... are subject to judicial check," but that the
"scope of that review" is "extremely limited and highly deferential"). But see Heckler v Chaney,
470 US 821, 832-33 (1985) (noting that agency enforcement actions are presumptively not sub-
ject to judicial review). See also 5 USC § 706(1) (1994) (stating that "[t]he reviewing court shall
... compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed").
73 The intuition here is that the court, like President, must assume that w falls within some
range when the value of r does not disclose the value of w. In the upper end of that range
Agency can issue a regulation that is on average efficient but inefficient at the upper end.
74 The argument is the same as the explanation for why presidents who are anti-
intervention or moderately pro-intervention benefit from cost-benefit analysis under the precise
signal theory. See Part I.F
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sanctions, President is made better off, because Agency loses its in-
formational advantage. But it does not follow that the outcomes will
be efficient. If President and Agency are more interventionist than ef-
ficiency requires, outcomes will also be more interventionist than effi-
ciency requires. When cost-benefit analysis is enforced by courts,
President will be made better off (1) as President's ideal point ap-
proaches efficiency; and (2) as Agency's ideal point becomes increas-
ingly higher than President's. It remains true that a President with
non-efficiency goals can benefit from judicially enforced cost-benefit
analysis.
C. Congress as Principal; Multiple Principals
Cost-benefit analysis has become common over the last two dec-
ades mainly because of executive orders issued by Presidents Reagan
and Clinton, and for that reason scholars associate cost-benefit analy-
sis with the executive branch. The natural treatment of cost-benefit
analysis from a positive political theory perspective, then, is thg Presi-
dent as principal and the agency as agent. But Congress also has
shown an interest in cost-benefit analysis. Several regulatory statutes
require agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis,75 and others have
been interpreted to permit agencies to use cost-benefit analysis.16 And,
as noted earlier, there have been efforts to enact bills that require al-
most all regulatory agencies to use cost-benefit analysis regardless of
the language in the authorizing statute.77
Who is the principal, then: the President or Congress? The answer
is that both are, to a degree. On the one hand, Congress has the ulti-
mate authority to delegate regulatory power to the agencies; indeed,
one might think of the President as an agent of Congress. On the
other hand, the President has an independent political base, and this
creates authority to pursue projects through the agencies, whose per-
sonnel are members of the executive branch and subordinates of the
President. The truth is that the lines of authority are tangled, and it is
plausible to treat the President and Congress as independent princi-
pals, and any given agency as a joint agent. For clarity, the Article dis-
cusses (1) Congress as the sole principal and (2) Congress and the
President as joint principals.
75 See, for example, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 USC § 136(bb);
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 USC § 2605(c); Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 USC
§§ 1532,1571.
76 For a discussion of cases that interpret statutes to permit cost-benefit analysis, see Part
IV.C.
77 See notes 16, 63-68.
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1. Congress as the principal.
Assume that Congress has a unitary interest, and that it cannot
directly implement its goals legislatively because of the press of time,
uncertainty, and lack of specialization. Congress creates an agency and
directs it to implement a general authorizing statute. The agency is
likely to have interests that diverge from Congress's, just as the
agency's interests are likely to diverge from the President's. The rea-
sons are that Congress does not have full control over the personnel
of the agency, and Congress's interest will change over time. Congress
can sanction the agencies in various ways. For now, consider the blunt-
est sanction: the ability to reverse an agency project by enacting a new
law (with or without the help of the President).8
We need not devote much space to the Congress-agency axis be-
cause the analysis is the same as the President-agency analysis or the
judicial analysis. In the absence of cost-benefit analysis, the agency has
two sources of power: its ability to set the agenda and its superior in-
formation. The result is the same as the equilibrium described in Fig-
ure 2. The agency will use its agenda-setting power to bias projects in a
more interventionist direction than Congress desires. The information
asymmetry results in the agency choosing more extreme projects over
a range of low values of w, and declining to implement projects when
w is negative and close to 0 (see Table 2). If Congress directs agencies
to perform and report cost-benefit analyses, and retains the power to
impose political sanctions, then the analysis is the same as the Presi-
dent-agency case: Congress learns the location of the status quo and
can reverse projects that fail to produce an outcome closer to Con-
gress's ideal point than the status quo.79 However, if Congress legisla-
tively requires agencies to comply with cost-benefit analysis, and gives
courts the task of enforcing this requirement, then the analysis is the
same as the judicial case: cost-benefit analysis will be desirable only
when Congress's ideal point is close enough to efficiency or suffi-
ciently less interventionist than Agency's.-
78 This is not at all uncommon. One recent example, chosen at random, is Congress's rever-
sal of the FCC's low-power FM radio rules. For a discussion, see Stewart Benjamin, Douglas
Lichtman, and Howard Shelanski, Telecommunications Law and Policy 325-32 (Carolina 2001).
However, legislative rejection is not exactly the same as presidential rejection (in the model). It
requires collective action, rather than unilateral action, of course, and a supermajority unless the
President cooperates. And if it does not occur before the final rule is issued, Congress must de-
cide whether to make the override prospective or retroactive, and in the latter case various judi-
cial constraints may come into play.
79 Congress will need a two-thirds majority it as seems likely, the President will not go
along with reversal of the agency. See US Const Art I, § 7, cl 2.
80 See Part II.B.
1170 [68:1137
Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis
2. Congress and the President as principals.
There are different kinds of multiple principal problems. One
conflict is between Congress and the President. Another conflict is be-
tween members of Congress, or between congressional committees,"
or between House and Senate, or between the parties that control dif-
ferent elements of the executive, legislature, and judiciary. A natural
question is whether the existence of conflicting principals increases or
reduces the attractiveness of cost-benefit analysis. Focus on the sim-
plest conflict, between the President and a unitary Congress.
It turns out that cost-benefit analysis has limited value when




Case1 -1 w=-2A C=-A P=O A 2A 1
Case 2 P = -A C=0
F marks the outcome in the full information (cost-benefit) ver-
sion of the game, and I marks the outcome in the asymmetric informa-
tion version, given the assumption that w = -2A. Case 1 is identical to
the assumptions of the earlier analysis of the game except Congress's
ideal point, C, is inserted between P and w (Congress is assumed to be
less interventionist than President). Case 2 reverses the locations of P
and C, and assumes that C = 0 and P < 0. The other parameters remain
the same and are not reproduced in the figure.
Assume that Congress and President must agree in order to re-
ject Agency's project, and if they reject Agency's project, the status
quo prevails.? Focus on Case 1. In the full information version of the
game, Agency will choose r = 3A just as in the earlier model without
Congress. This project is Agency's best, because it achieves Agency's
ideal point. The project is worse for Congress than the status quo, but
81 Much work focuses on congressional committees, treating them as the relevant princi-
pals in the relationship with agencies. In Epstein and O'Halloran's recent book, for example, the
committee has partial information about w, and reports a bill to the floor. The floor, which has no
information about w, then decides on the content of the bill and whether to delegate to an
agency. In the latter case, the President sets the agency's ideal point, and then the agency ob-
serves w and sets policy. See Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers at 182-87 (cited in note
24).
82 There are plausible alternative assumptions: for example, that Congress or President can
unilaterally reverse the regulation. This would reduce Agency's agenda-setting power, forcing it
to choose a project within the acceptance region of the more distant principal. This is an im-
provement for the principals only when their ideal points are close and the status quo is close to
their ideal points; otherwise, regulation may become impossible.
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because the project improves President's utility, President will not
agree to reject it. In short, the addition of Congress does not change
the outcome of the earlier model, and that is true in the incomplete in-
formation version of the game as well. Agency chooses r = 4A in order
to signal that w is relatively low. Given that President approves the
project, Congress cannot influence the outcome even though Congress
would, if it could act by itself, reject the project.
If the locations of President and Congress are reversed (Case 2),
the analysis does not change. The difference is that now Congress has
influence and President does not, and Agency's outcomes will not
make Congress worse off but will make President worse off compared
to the status quo.
The conclusion of this simple examination is that cost-benefit
analysis is desirable for two principals just as it is desirable for one
principal, because it permits the principals to learn about Agency's ac-
tion. But the benefit of cost-benefit analysis diminishes as the conflict
between the two principals increases."3 The reason is that when princi-
pals cannot agree, they are in a poorer position to discipline an agency
that chooses an extreme project." Thus, one conjectures that cost-
benefit analysis becomes less likely to be required as the number of
principals rises and their ideal points diverge." This may explain the
difficulty in enacting a statute that compels agencies to conduct cost-
benefit analysis: Congress might think that such a statute will have lit-
tle effect if it is not unified enough (internally, or with the President)
to impose political sanctions on agencies that fail to comply with cost-
benefit analysis."
83 See Matthew D. McCubbins, The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, 29 Am J Pol
Sci 721,741-42 (1985) (arguing that when legislators' interests conflict, they are less likely to give
discretion to an agency).
84 Each principal enjoys half the benefit in the two-principal case that it enjoys in the one-
principal case. This is because the benefit in the first case is the same as in the one-principal case
50 percent of the time, and there is no benefit for that principal during the other 50 percent of
the time.
85 In the extreme case in which one principal has an ideal point greater than Agency's, the
more interventionist principal will never reverse Agency in the one-principal model and will
never agree to reverse Agency in the two-principal model. Thus introducing cost-benefit analysis
does not change the Agency's utility. The other principal's utility is improved in the one-principal
model but not in the two-principal model because in the latter model the other principal never
consents to reversal of the project. This Article will not discuss the even more complex case in
which the two principals have different amounts of information about w.
86 In reality the conflict between President and Congress has taken two forms: sporadic ef-
forts by Congress to reduce the power of OIRA, and new substantive legislation that imposed
greater constraints directly on agencies, so that they could not comply with cost-benefit analyses
without violating the law. See Terry M. Moe and Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of
Structure, 57 L & Contemp Probs 1, 37-40 (Spring 1.994) (discussing control over regulatory ac-
tion as "an issue that captures the essence of the institutional battle between the President and
Congress").
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D. The Role of Interest Groups and the Public
In many models in positive political theory interest groups may
reveal information to Congress that enables Congress to discipline the




-1 w I P=O A 1
Interest Group's ideal point is 1, and in this example I < P < A.
Think of Agency as the EPA and Interest Group as the Business
Roundtable: Agency seeks more aggressive regulation and Interest
Group seeks less aggressive regulation. It is assumed that Interest
Group, like Agency, knows the location of w. The time line is now:
(1) w is determined; (2) Agency proposes the project, r; (3) Interest
Group announces to President that it opposes or endorses the project;
and (4) President accepts or rejects the project.
In the complete information version of the model Interest Group
cannot affect the outcome. Agency proposes a regulation, r > 0, that
brings the outcome closer to Agency's ideal point, but chooses an r
just low enough to make President indifferent between the project
and the status quo. Because Interest Group has no information that
President lacks, its announcement to President will be ignored.
In the incomplete information version of the model, however, In-
terest Group can affect the outcome under certain conditions.9 Sup-
pose that w falls just below I (technically, -A + 21 < w < 1). Interest
Group prefers a low-value project, President a medium-value project,
and Agency a high-value project. Agency knows that Interest Group
will refuse to endorse a project that creates an outcome farther from I
than is the status quo. President also knows this and can use this in-
formation along with knowledge about the distance between A and I
to estimate the location of w. For example, if A and I are very far
apart, Agency proposes a low-value project, and Interest Group re-
jects the project, President can infer that w is very close to I, because
otherwise Interest Group would benefit from a project that increases
the outcome only a little bit from a status quo much worse than L An-
other example is when r is high and Interest Group endorses the pro-
87 Epstein and O'Halloran, 11 J L, Econ, & Org at 237-39 (cited in note 34). Note, how-
ever, that this Article's model uses President where they use Congress.
88 Interest Group's utility function is U, = -(r + w - I)2
89 See Epstein and O'Halloran, 11 J L, Econ, & Org at 237-39 (cited in note 34).
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ject. President knows that if Interest Group endorses the project, w
must be very low, in which case the project will benefit President as
well. This is like an antiregulation business group endorsing a costly
antipollution regulation issued by the EPA. One infers that the envi-
ronmental problem must be very bad if the business group en-
dorses it.
The Interest Group's informational advantage, coupled with the
conflict between President and Agency, gives the Interest Group
power to bias outcomes. If President will obey Interest Group's mes-
sage under certain conditions, then Agency knows that under those
conditions it must propose a project that makes Interest Group at
least as well off as in the status quo. For example, if w = 1, Interest
Group will disapprove any project; President will obey Interest
Group's message because in this region on average Interest Group's
message is credible; and so Agency will not bother to propose a pro-
ject r > 0, even though a relatively low value project could make
Agency and President better off.91
The lesson is that interest groups sometimes help government
principals control agencies by disclosing information to the princi-
pals." But in providing this help interest groups can bias project out-
comes in a way that benefits them.
The effect of cost-benefit analysis is striking. By revealing the lo-
cation of w, cost-benefit analysis eliminates Interest Group's informa-
tional advantage. Lacking that advantage, Interest Group cannot in-
fluence Agency's choice of project. Thus, cost-benefit analysis reduces
the influence of interest groups.
This argument is more complex than it appears. The argument is
not that cost-benefit analysis eliminates the influence of interest
groups altogether. This would occur only if cost-benefit analysis be-
came the mandatory (constitutional) standard for all legislation and
90 Interest Group's statements will not always be credible, in which case President will not
pay attention to them when deciding what to do. For example, if r < 0, President knows that w
must be greater than A and that the project will not reduce the outcome below A. Because w is
greater than A and A is greater than P, President benefits from the project and will approve it
regardless of Interest Group's statement.
91 For a graphical analysis, see Epstein and O'Halloran, 11 J L, Econ, & Org at 238 fig 3
(cited in note 34) (showing equilibrium where 1 < P < A).
92 This is an important theme in the positive political theory literature, and underlies a
number of theories of interest group lobbying. See, for example, Ainsworth, 55 J Pol at 41 (cited
in note 53) (arguing that legislators take measures to avoid undue interest group influence);
David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright, Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator's Vote, 9 Soc
Choice & Welfare 229, 229-33 (1992) (developing a model showing that interest groups can in-
fluence legislators by providing important information); Banks and Weingast, 36 Am J Pol Sci at
509-11 (cited in note 34) (assuming that politicians have access to interest group information in
assessing agencies); Jan Potters and Frans Van Winden, Lobbying and Asymmetric Information,
74 Pub Choice 269, 270-71 (1992) (explaining how lobbying information can influence legisla-
tors).
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executive action." In the model, interest groups retain a hidden influ-
ence on the location of the other players' ideal points. Through cam-
paign contributions interest groups move the ideal points of Congress
and the President left or right, and possibly affect the ideal points of
the agency by holding out the prospect of employment and other fu-
ture benefits to the agency's personnel who are friendly. This does not
change when cost-benefit analysis is introduced. What does change is
that the interest group loses the leverage that superior information
gives it. It cannot use its superior information to influence President
and, through President, Agency, with the result that outcomes will be
closer to President's ideal point than they would be in the absence of
cost-benefit analysis.95 This is an attractive feature of cost-benefit
analysis, one to which I will return below.9
E. Relation to Other Techniques of Agency Control
The argument so far has made simplifying assumptions about the
tools at the President's and Congress's disposal for monitoring agen-
cies and punishing agencies that issue unwanted regulations. The
model assumed that President can punish Agency only by rejecting (or
blocking or delaying) a project, with the result that the status quo
would prevail rather than an outcome nearer to Agency's ideal point.
The analysis assumed that Congress can punish Agency in the same
way, and also by directing courts to reject projects. In all of these cases,
the sanction endured by Agency is the loss of an opportunity to
change the status quo in a direction that it prefers. But Congress and
the President have other tools at their disposal.
1. Requiring notice and public participation.
The Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to give no-
tice before issuing regulations, and to accept comment from the pub-
lic." These requirements force agencies to divulge information in ad-
vance of their action, which permits the government principal to in-
93 In essence, this is the claim of those who would constitutionalize the efficiency rule in
order to eliminate rent-seeking. See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Takings 100-04 (Harvard
1985).
94 It is possible that cost-benefit analysis enhances the ability of interest groups to lobby by
supplying information to Congress and the President about the effect of agencies' projects. This
would be true only if interest groups start off with inferior information, which seems doubtful for
industry groups, though it may be true for public interest organizations and grassroots move-
ments. Thus, cost-benefit analysis could have a more complex effect than that described in the
text, leading indirectly to changes in the players' ideal points.
95 Assuming as always that President's ideal point is not too far from efficiency.
96 McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 3 J L, Econ, & Org at 255-56 (cited in note 22), make a
similar point about the publicity requirements of the APA.
97 5 USC § 553 (1994 & Supp 1996).
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tervene and redirect the agency's resources if necessary. These re-
quirements also enable interest groups to learn of impending regula-
tions and alert the government principal98 and to influence regulation
in comment proceedings. As a result, the agency's agenda-setting
power is reduced. Principals can intervene early in the regulatory
process, in which case the agency cannot as easily confront them with
a take-it-or-leave-it offer.-
2. Firing agency chiefs.
Suppose the head of the agency cares little about policy but does
want a reputation for loyalty to the President. In the case of ordinary
regulatory agencies, the President can discipline the agency by threat-
ening to fire the agency head if the agency's projects depart too far
from the President's ideal point, or by threatening to withhold future
positions that would otherwise be the reward for loyal behavior. If the
President's threat is credible-and it will be, as long as there are other
loyal and competent people who can take over the position-the
agency head will approve projects closer to the President's ideal point.
This is not as clearly true for independent agencies. The President act-
ing alone can punish heads of independent agencies only by withhold-
ing future benefits from others, not by firing them.° Otherwise the
President can punish these agencies by joining Congress in enacting
punitive legislation. '
3. Appointing agency chiefs.
The President can also ensure that the agency's projects are de-
sirable by appointing as head of the agency only people whose ideal
points are close to the President's."" If the agency head controls the
98 See McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 3 J L, Econ, & Org at 256-59 (cited in note 22).
99 A similar interpretation can be given to Exec Order No 12498,3 CFR 323 (1985), which
requires agencies to reveal in an annual report their regulatory plans for the following year.
100 For an argument that under current law the President has some supervisory power over
independent agencies, see Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U Chi L Rev 1, 29-34 (1995).
101 The President can also discipline the independent agencies through the Department of
Justice, which has the power to intervene in agency proceedings, through control of some agency
personnel and facilities, and through OMB supervisions of legislative proposals issued by the
agencies. See Stephen G. Breyer et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems, Text,
and Cases 100-02 (Aspen 4th ed 1999); Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the
Independent Regulatory Process, 8 Admin L J 461,499-504 (1994).
102 See Randall L. Calvert, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast, A Theory of Po-
litical Control and Agency Discretion, 33 Am J Pol Sci 588, 602-03, 607-08 (1989) (showing that
appointment power of executives tends to bring in agency officials who agree with President's
preferences). Compare Daniel F Spulber and David Besanko, Delegation, Commitment, and the
Regulatory Mandate, 8 J L, Econ, & Org 126, 152 (1992) (pointing out how appointment, statutes,
and oversight help the President and Congress control administrative agencies).
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agency's behavior, then the agency's and the President's ideal points
will be close to each other, and as a result the projects desired by the
agency will be to the President's liking.
4. Modifying the agency's budget, internal procedures,
and jurisdiction.
The President and Congress have the power to punish a wayward
agency by reducing the agency's budget. This prevents the agency
from implementing as many projects as it would like to."' The Presi-
dent and Congress can also modify the agency's procedures in various
ways. For example, they can require environmental impact statements.
These requirements increase the expense of projects, thus having the
same effect as a decrease in the budget. Congress and the President
can strip agencies of jurisdiction or impose heavier legal standards on
them. And they also can restrict the power of one agency by requiring
it to work with another agency."°
5. Congressional oversight.
Much discussed in the positive political theory literature is the
ability of Congress to control agencies by holding hearings on the
agency's actions, which may generate bad publicity for the agency and
interfere with its activities. The literature argues among other things
that Congress can overcome its information disadvantage by engaging
in spot checks, just the way the IRS guards against tax fraud through
random audits. As in Becker's model of criminal enforcement, if Con-
gress can impose a severe enough sanction, the combination of prob-
abilistic enforcement and the enhanced sanction would deter agency
misbehavior."4 In this light, cost-benefit analysis can be compared to
the tax reporting rules, which make it easier for the IRS to evaluate
the behavior of the taxpayer that it audits by compelling the taxpayer
to reveal tax-related behavior in a routinized form.
103 See Randall L. Calvert, Mark J. Moran, and Barry R. Weingast, Congressional Influence
over Policymaking: The Case of the FTC in Congress: Structure and Policy, in Matthew D.
McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy 493 (Cambridge 1987).
104 See Matthew D. McCubbins and Talbot Page, A Theory of Congressional Delegation, in
McCubbins and Sullivan, eds, Congress at 409 (cited in note 103); McCubbins, Noll, and Wein-
gast, 3 J L, Econ, & Org at 260-71 (cited in note 22). An example of jurisdiction sharing is
OSHA's authority to regulate only those health hazards identified by the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health. The two agencies are controlled by different congressional
committees. Id at 267.
105 See, for example, Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Over-
sight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am J Pol Sci 165, 165-67 (1984) (discuss-
ing Congress's oversight abilities).
106 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J Pol Econ 169, 172
(1968) (discussing deterrent effects of punishment).
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6. Other standards: risk-risk.
Agencies could be directed to use decision procedures other than
cost-benefit analysis. A number of scholars have argued for the risk-
risk standard, which holds that a regulation should be rejected if the
risks it reduces are offset by increased risks.' The problem with this
standard compared to cost-benefit analysis is that it neglects relevant
considerations. As an example, consider estrogen therapy which re-
duces risks associated with menopause, including the risks of heart
disease and osteoporosis, but increases the risk of certain cancers.
Risk-risk analysis directs the decision maker to weigh these risks, but
it says little about how the risks should be weighed. One might think
that life expectancy is the proper standard-that he therapy ought to
be approved if it increases life expectancy-but that approach does
not take account of the cost of having an unpleasant but not life-
threatening disease, as well as all the other quality of life costs that the
therapy is intended to alleviate, including hot flashes and discomfort
during sexual intercourse.' If the agency is not permitted to assign
costs to these factors, then it is hard to see how the use of the risk-risk
procedure will improve the welfare of citizens or have much political
support. If the agency is required to assign costs to all risks, and to do
so in a systematic way, then risk-risk converges to cost-benefit. But
this much can be said about the procedure: it may reduce agency dis-
cretion partially, and in a way that is closer to the principals' ideal
points than in the case of cost-benefit analysis if the principal cares
mainly about the identified risks and not about the costs and benefits.
If so, one might observe its use as a disciplinary device despite its
many problems.
These tools enable the government principal to control agencies
in a variety of ways, and they surely enhance the principal's control
over agencies beyond the power to block or delay the project (in the
case of the President) or overturn it by legislation (in the case of Con-
gress). But introducing these tools into the original model does not
change its qualitative results. Agencies will choose projects somewhat
closer to President's and/or Congress's ideal points when the latter do
not conflict too much, but agencies will continue to bias the outcomes
107 John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in John D.
Graham and Jonathan Baert Weiner, eds, Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the
Environment 1, 19-41 (Harvard 1995) (developing a framework for risk tradeoff analysis). For a
discussion of other standards, such as QUALYs, see Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 233-38
(cited in note 26).
108 Evridiki Hatziandreau, Constance Williams, and John D. Graham, Estrogen Therapy for
Menopause, in Graham and Weiner, eds, Risk versus Risk at 42, 43-50 (cited in note 107).
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in their own favor. When information is incomplete, signaling will oc-
cur with losses on all sides. Every one of these alternative tools, more-
over, has limited power because the government principal does not
want to constrain agencies so much that the latter cannot accomplish
anything. Reducing the budget, stripping jurisdiction, hiring and firing
agency heads, and harassing agencies with oversight hearings will in-
terfere with good projects as well as bad projects.
III. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
The argument so far produces two sets of empirical predictions.
The first set concerns the effect of the introduction of cost-benefit
analysis on policy outcomes. The second set concerns the conditions
under which government principals will impose cost-benefit analysis
on existing agencies.
The first set of predictions is that the introduction of cost-benefit
analysis results in (1) more projects being implemented, including pro-
jects that fail cost-benefit analysis (see Table 2, row 3); and (2) lower
value regulations being implemented when w is negative but not too
low (see Table 2, row 2). In addition, (3) the increase in the number of
projects described in prediction (1) and the reduction in the value of
regulations over the range described in prediction (2) will be greater
as Agency's ideal point increases relative to President's.
The second set of predictions is that President is more likely to
require Agency to engage in cost-benefit analysis as (4) Agency's ideal
point becomes higher than President's, and (5) cost-benefit analysis
becomes cheaper and more precise."
These predictions are not easy to test. One problem is selection
bias. If one observes a pool of agencies with different ideal points, and
only some of them are required to engage in cost-benefit analysis, it
could be that the agencies engaging in cost-benefit analysis implement
fewer projects than the other agencies (contrary to prediction 1). The
reason is that if the other agencies have ideal points close enough to
President, the latter will approve all or nearly all their projects;
whereas agencies with distant ideal points that engage in cost-benefit
analysis will not implement projects between 0 and A (see Table 2,
row 4).
There are also countervailing forces that have been identified. If
cost-benefit analysis is sufficiently expensive or blunt, its introduction
109 There are other predictions, as well: that the precise signal version of cost-benefit analy-
sis is more likely to be used when President's ideal point is close to efficiency, but that the blunt
signal version of cost-benefit analysis is no more nor less likely to be used when President's ideal
point is close to efficiency; that cost-benefit analysis is less likely to be used as President and
Congress have greater conflicts; and that Interest Group will have less influence over regulations
governed by cost-benefit analysis than regulations not governed by cost-benefit analysis.
11792001]
The University of Chicago Law Review
may reduce rather than increase the number of projects. If President
cares little about efficiency, and cost-benefit analysis is enforced by
courts or is a precise signal, predictions will be weaker. And if Con-
gress has an ideal point sufficiently different from President's, cost-
benefit analysis may not restrain agencies much at all."° Finally, one
would need to hold constant a large number of complex variables, in-
cluding the agency's budget and personnel; the degree to which gov-
erning legislative standards depart from cost-benefit analysis; eco-
nomic and ideological trends; and the incentive that Congress and the
President would have to create an agency in the first place when they
anticipate that ideological conflict will make it difficult to discipline
the agency."'
110 A further complication is that the relevant variable may be the ideal point of the con-
gressional committee that has jurisdiction over the agency in question.
111 For empirical work showing that agencies are responsive to sanctions, and thus to the
changing goals or identities of principals, see Nathaniel Beck, Elections and the Fed: Is There a
Political Monetary Cycle?, 31 Am J Pol Sci 194, 198-99 (1987) (noting that "presidential prefer-
ences are a key determinant of Fed policy"); Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization,
28 Am J Pol Sci 739,765-72 (1984) (alleging that legislators and agencies fit well in a hierarchical
model that allows legislators to exert control over agencies); Barry R. Weingast and Mark J.
Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?: Regulating Policymaking by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 91 J Pol Econ 765, 792-93 (1983) (providing evidence that the FTC re-
sponds to congressional sanctions).
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Let us examine some data. The graph in Figure 7 displays major
health and safety regulations issued by government agencies between
1967 and 1989. The x-axis represents the year of promulgation; the y-
axis represents the cost per life saved in millions of 1992 dollars. Al-
though cost per life saved is not the same as efficiency, it is a useful
proxy with regard to these regulations because they are directed to-
ward problems of health and safety.113 The vertical line shows the year
of Reagan's executive order, 1981. The horizontal line represents a
regulation that assumes a five million dollar value for a statistical life,
114which is the midpoint of the range estimated by empirical studies.
The graph shows no noticeable trend toward greater efficiency after
the executive order. (Some post-1981 outliers are omitted to keep the
scale within reasonable bounds.) This is confirmed by regressions,"
but is adequately illustrated in Figure 8.
112 The data are taken from Scott Farrow, Improving Regulatory Performance: Does Execu-
tive Office Oversight Matter? (July 26,2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
113 A four million dollar environmental regulation that saves one statistical life and also en-
hances the recreational value of a wilderness by two million dollars is an efficient regulation
even though the cost per life saved is four million dollars. A more accurate accounting would ac-
cordingly include benefits other than reduced mortality. But it seems unlikely that the post-1981
regulations have a larger nonmortality component than the pre-1981 regulations.
114 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J Econ Lit 1912, 1930
(1993). Viscusi used 1990 dollars, but the figures are rough anyway.
115 See Farrow, Improving Regulatory Performance table 4 (cited in note 112); Robert W.
Hahn, Regulatory Reform:Assessing the Government's Numbers 28 table 7, AFI-Brookings Joint
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FIGURE 8
EFFICIENCY OF COST PER LIFE SAVED USED IN REGULATIONS
ISSUED BEFORE AND AFTER 1981116
Inefficient Efficient Total
Pre-1981 6 7 13
Post-1981 19 17 36
Total 25 24 49
Figure 8 divides the regulations according to whether they were
issued before or after 1981 and whether they are efficient. It is clear
that the efficiency of regulations does not increase after 1981. This
evidence is bolstered by studies that show that post-1981 cost-benefit
analyses are frequently defective. Agencies often provide implausible
estimates of costs and benefits, use different discount rates and valua-
tions across regulations, and even fail to monetize or quantify all the
relevant costs and benefits."' One study of forty-eight rules issued be-
Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 99-6 (July 1999). Both authors examined health
and safety regulations issued before and after 1981, and found no statistically significant rela-
tionship between their cost-effectiveness and a dummy variable representing whether the regula-
tion was issued before or after 1981. (Although the authors name this dummy variable OIRA
because their studies focus on that institution, one cannot separate out the effect of OIRA and
the cost-benefit executive order.)
116 Pearson chi2 = 0.1677; Pr = 0.682. The data source is Farrow, Improving Regulatory
Performance (cited in note 112).
117 Hahn's review of all 168 final and proposed rules issued from 1981 through mid-1996
found that only 26 percent of the rules were accompanied by an estimate of monetized benefits,
Hahn, Regulatory Reform at 6 table 1 (cited in note 115), and that 23 percent of the rules were
accompanied by a statement that the benefits exceed the costs, id at 41 table 9. Hahn's own cal-
culations indicate that about 43 percent of the rules would pass a cost-benefit test, depending on
various assumptions. See id at 43 table 10. Hahn and his coauthors also reviewed forty-eight
regulatory impact assessments (which contain the cost-benefit analysis) published from 1996 to
1999, and found that agencies presented monetized costs and benefits for only 19 percent of the
rules. See Robert W. Hahn et al, Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure ofAgencies to
Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 Harv J L & Pub Pol 859, 871 (2000). See also Office of
Management and Budget, Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations ch
3 (Sept 30,1997) (reporting that of twenty-one economically significant rules issued in the past
year, agencies supplied monetized costs in eight cases and monetized benefits in sixteen cases);
Grubb et al, The Ambiguities of Benefit-Cost Analysis at 154 (cited in note 30) (finding that indi-
viduals in the Department of Agriculture performed "perfunctory" cost-benefit analyses using
"incomprehensible" numbers both before and after the Reagan executive order); Winston Har-
rington et al, On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, Resources for the Future Discussion
Paper 99-18 (Jan 1999), available online at <http://www.rff.org/CFDOCS/disc-papers/
PDFfiles/1999.htm> (visited Sept 27, 2001) (finding in a study of twenty-five regulations that
agencies tend to overestimate the costs of complying with regulations); Robert W. Hahn, Regula-
tory Reform: What Do the Government's Numbers Tell Us?, in Robert W. Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs
and Lives Saved 208,218 (Oxford 1996) (finding that thirty-eight of eighty-three rules proposed
or issued from 1990 to 1995 passed a cost-benefit test); Arthur Fraas, The Role of Economic
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tween 1996 and 1999 concluded that Regulatory Impact Analyses
"typically do not provide enough information to enable the regulatory
agencies to make decisions that will maximize the efficiency or effec-
tiveness of a rule.' "8
The data contradict the common sense theory that the introduc-
tion of a cost-benefit requirement would improve the efficiency of
regulations, either directly by constraining agencies or indirectly (in
our analysis) by giving the President greater power over agencies."9
But we observed before that there is also good reason to think that
the Reagan executive order should not have changed the behavior of
agencies because the President does not have a credible threat to pun-
ish an agency that performs a shoddy cost-benefit analysis. Indeed,
agencies had the same incentive before and after the executive order.
The data are consistent with this argument, although one cannot have
much confidence in a zero result.
Further work will be necessary to establish that the number of
regulations increased, and that the increase was caused by the execu-
tive order's effect on agency oversight.' If Reagan, Bush, and Clinton
had no interest in efficient regulation, but did have an interest in en-
suring that agencies made regulatory transfers to the right interest
groups, then their cost-benefit orders, coupled with their freedom to
reward or sanction agencies in whatever way they wanted to, would
have the predictable effect of increasing the amount and inefficiency
of regulation.12
Analysis in Shaping Environmental Policy, 54 L & Contemp Probs 114, 124 (1992) (pointing out
errors in RIAs for lead phasedown and asbestos regulations); Maureen L. Cropper et al, The De-
terminants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making, in Roger D.
Congleton, ed, The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis & Evidence 140
(Michigan 1996) (finding that EPA's pesticide regulations implicitly value statistical lives in a
range between sixty thousand dollars and thirty-five million dollars); Adler and Posner, 29 J Le-
gal Stud at 1146 (cited in note 9) (finding that agencies use a wide range of valuations of life);
Edward R. Morrison, Comment, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 65 U Chi L Rev 1333,1364-69 (1998) (finding that agencies use a wide range of
discount rates). This literature is large, and this is just a sample.
118 Hahn, 23 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 861 (cited in note 117).
119 A more complete test would need to take account of alternative explanations for the
failure of regulations to improve in efficiency after 1981. It is possible that efficiency improve-
ments did occur but that they did not show up in the data. It is also possible that there was a lag
between the appearance of the executive order and its spread through the bureaucracy in the
face of the inertia of entrenched procedures and ways of thinking.
120 Becker and Mulligan consider several proxies for government regulation. Most of these
measures declined from 1980 to 1990, including committee staff size and Federal Register pages;
several stayed constant; and only one (U.S. Code pages) increased. All these measures have ob-
vious problems. See Gary S. Becker and Casey B. Mulligan, Accounting for the Growth of Gov-
ernment 22-28, University of Chicago Working Paper (Nov 1999) (on file with author).
121 Further work is necessary to investigate the other predictions; for example, that the
ideological distance of President and Agency influences the effect of introducing cost-benefit
analysis.
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The second set of predictions concerned the likelihood that a
president would order agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis when
they would otherwise be disinclined because of the costs and risks of
the procedure. As noted above, one possibility is that such an order
would have no effect, in which case it could only be symbolic behavior.
But let us put this possibility aside. One of the predictions was that the
likelihood of ordering agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis in-
creases with the ideological distance between President and Agency.
Reagan's executive order of 1981 is the starting point for evaluating
this prediction. When Reagan entered office, the agencies had been
controlled by and staffed by a Democratic president and a Democ-
ratic Congress, in the latter case for many years, and it was surely the
case that the agencies had developed a sense of mission consistent
with their Democratic roots. But Reagan would likely have sought
cost-benefit oversight even if the regime change had been less abrupt.
Clinton, like Reagan, benefited from agencies' cost-benefit analyses
because it gave him information about what agencies were doing.
What is surprising is not that a Democratic president would require
agencies to use cost-benefit analysis but that it was not used by presi-
dents before Reagan.
There are many possible reasons for this. One is that before the
1980s the methodology was not sufficiently developed to be useful.
Another is that the cost and delay associated with cost-benefit analy-
sis was considered too high a price to pay for information at a time
(the 1970s) when environmental regulation was considered urgent.'22 A
final reason is, as Figures 7 and 8 suggest, that cost-benefit analysis
was thought unnecessary because the early regulations were efficient!
The disillusionment with modern regulations did not occur until the
late 1970s, shortly before Reagan came to power with a mandate for
regulatory reform. '
A test of prediction (4) is to look at whether cost-benefit analysis
is imposed more rigorously on agencies whose ideal points are far
from the President's than on agencies whose ideal points are close.
Because Reagan and Clinton ordered nearly all regulatory agencies to
perform cost-benefit analysis, the test is possible only if one can dis-
tinguish agencies against which the executive orders were rigorously
enforced by the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") and
those against which they were weakly enforced. Anecdotal evidence
suggests, for example, that Reagan's OMB was stricter with the EPA
122 See Andrews, Economic and Environmental Decisions at 52-56 (cited in note 59) (not-
ing the acceleration of environmental programs and agencies in the 1970s).
123 See Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour, Politics Position, and Power: From the Posi-
tive to the Regulator)' State 130-31 (Oxford 4th ed 1986) (detailing President Reagan's emphasis
on regulatory reform).
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than was Clinton's OMB.'24 If the distance between Reagan's ideal
point and his EPA's ideal point was greater than the distance between
Clinton's ideal point and his EPA's ideal point-and this seems likely
even though both presidents appointed the head of the EPA-then
the greater strictness at Reagan's OMB is consistent with the predic-
tion. A more systematic test would be feasible if the ideological posi-
tions of agencies or agency heads could be measured.
Congress first became enthusiastic about cost-benefit analysis in
1995, and since then has tried several times to require agencies to
comply with this procedure. The clear explanation is divided govern-
ment: the Republican majority in Congress elected in 1994 sought to
limit the discretion of Clinton appointees.' The weaker 1999 bill,
which unlike the 1995 bills did not provide for direct judicial enforce-
ment of the cost-benefit analysis, was introduced in a much less ideo-
logically charged environment.) This story is consistent in a loose way
with the blunt signal theory: by imposing a cost on agencies when both
the agencies and the President had more interventionist ideal points
than did Congress, Congress would move policy outcomes in its de-
sired less interventionist direction.'
27
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
A. A (Qualified) Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis
The literature on cost-benefit abstracts away from its institutional
role. Authors typically compare the outcomes produced by cost-
benefit analysis with the outcomes that are normatively desirable, and
defend or criticize cost-benefit analysis according to its accuracy in
implementing the normative goals. A common criticism, for example,
124 See Breyer et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy at 122-23 (cited in note 101)
(noting that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs under Reagan was criticized for
being too aggressive, while OIRA under Carter was criticized for being too cautious). For exam-
ple, the Breyer casebook notes that OSHA did not appear to believe that Clinton's OMB would
compel it to interpret its vague workplace safety statute to require cost-benefit balancing. See
generally International Union, UAW v OSHA, 37 F3d 665 (DC Cir 1994).
125 Spiller and Tiller, 26 J Legal Stud at 361 (cited in note 55) (explaining the history behind
the proposed Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995).
126 In 1995 there were 236 Republicans, 197 Democrats, and one independent (and one va-
cancy) in the House; in 1999 there were 222 Republicans, 212 Democrats, and one independent
in the House. In 1995 there were 53 Republicans and 46 Democrats (and one vacancy) in the
Senate; in 1999 there were 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats in the Senate. Partisanship de-
clined dramatically in the House, from 73 percent to 43 percent, and slightly in the Senate, from
69 percent to 63 percent. (The numbers refer to the percentage of recorded floor votes in which
a majority of one party voted against a majority of the other party.) See 51 Cong Q Almanac B-6,
B-7, C-8 (1995); 55 Cong Q Almanac A-14, A-15, B-7 (1999).
127 Loose, because the model does not consider the ability of Congress to control the Presi-
dent, as opposed to controlling agencies. But the argument is intuitive. See Spiller and Tiller, 26 J
Legal Stud at 361 (cited in note 55).
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is that because cost-benefit analysis gives more weight to the prefer-
ences of the wealthy than to the preferences of the poor, it approves
projects that have objectionable distributive consequences.'2 A com-
mon defense concedes that cost-benefit analysis generates errors-in
the sense of outcomes that are not socially desirable-but that it also
economizes on decision costs. On this view cost-benefit analysis mini-
mizes the sum of decision costs and error costs compared to alterna-
tive decision procedures.
This debate is mired in a philosophical and empirical bog. If one
believes that government should not concern itself with its citizens'
overall well-being, for example, or should be concerned mainly with
redistributing wealth, cost-benefit analysis will appear unattractive.
Although cost-benefit analysis is consistent with a broad array of
normative commitments,' it does not follow that people holding any
of these commitments would prefer cost-benefit analysis to another
procedure. These considerations depend on the errors created by cost-
benefit analysis in light of the normative goal, and this question intro-
duces a difficult empirical issue, namely, how much cost-benefit analy-
sis reduces decision costs.
Another problem with this debate is that it assumes that although
agencies may err, they loyally try to implement the goals of the princi-
pal, whether the principal is understood as the President, Congress, or
the public. But this assumption is wrong. If agencies could be de-
pended on to do whatever the principals wanted, there would be little
need for congressional oversight, the OMB, the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, and the many other institutions and laws that are intended
to prevent agencies from pursuing inappropriate goals.
Critics of cost-benefit analysis frequently overlook this institu-
tional dimension.8 They think of the regulatory agency as a School of
Athens in which the discovery of truth is the only end, and hierarchi-
cal superiors will take for granted the agency's loyalty and good faith.
But if agencies cannot justify their behavior without forcing busy
elected officials to reproduce their deliberations, then the purpose of
creating agencies in the first place is defeated. Critics of cost-benefit
analysis must supply not only an alternative evaluative method for
agencies-for example, "intelligent policy analysis ... open to refash-
128 Kelman, 5 Reg at 36-40 (cited in note 21); Richardson, 29 J Legal Stud at 972-73 (cited
in note 23).
129 Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 194-216 (cited in note 26).
130 A small sample includes: Richardson, 29 J Legal Stud at 972-73 (cited in note 23); Copp,
23 Theory & Decisions at 65 (cited in note 23); Kelman, 5 Reg at 35-36 (cited in note 21); Heinz-
erling, 107 Yale L J at 2042-64 (cited in note 23). Amartya Sen acknowledges the tradeoff be-
tween, as he puts it, usability and acceptability, but because he ignores the institutional reason for
this tradeoff-the principal-agent problem-he is unable to justify the particular tradeoff that he
advocates. See Sen, 29 J Legal Stud at 931 (cited in note 23).
1186 [68:1137
Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis
ioning aims and remaking ends in light of new information about the
pros and cons"'-but also an account of how review of agencies' de-
cisions made under this method is to proceed. If the evaluative
method is opaque to review, then the method, however ingenious,
must be rejected. And this would be true even if the loyalty of agen-
cies were unquestioned. For surely it would be unwise to shield even
exemplary regulatory activity from public scrutiny and debate.
Thinking about cost-benefit analysis as an instrument of con-
trol-that is, as a means for reducing agency costs-casts new light on
its justification. It also enables one to evaluate cost-benefit analysis
without plunging into the philosophical and political controversies
about the proper normative goals of government.2 We simplify the
analysis by making the following normative assumption: agencies
should implement he goals of the principals.33
In-the simplest case, the government principal seeks efficient pro-
jects. If the principal cannot control the agency, the agency will im-
plement projects that it prefers rather than the projects that the prin-
cipal prefers. If this problem is serious enough, the principal might not
create the agency in the first place. Cost-benefit analysis mitigates this
agency problem by making it easier for the principal to monitor the
agency. The principal can now sanction the agency if the agency im-
plements projects that fail cost-benefit analysis. Although cost-benefit
analysis is not a panacea-the agency retains its bargaining power and
can implement projects that the principal barely prefers to the status
quo -the agency's discretion is reduced, and the principal's welfare is
enhanced.
In the more realistic case, the principal cares not only about effi-
ciency but also about satisfying various constituents. Cost-benefit
analysis, however, retains its value. In terms of the model, it reveals
the location of the status quo, which enables the principal to deter-
131 Richardson, 29 J Legal Stud at 1003 (cited in note 23).
132 In an earlier article, Matthew Adler and I defended cost-benefit analysis on the ground
that it was consistent with maximizing overall well-being, which we took to be an important role
of the government. See Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 194-216 (cited in note 26). The current
argument provides an alternative ground for defending cost-benefit analysis. The two arguments
are not inconsistent, and they are mutually reinforcing if there is not too much political failure. If
the public cares about overall well-being and wants elected officials to maximize overall well-
being, then cost-benefit analysis is justified both because it directs agencies to maximize overall
well-being and because it enhances the ability of elected officials and judges to sanction agencies
that fail to maximize overall well-being.
133 There are some complexities that this Article must ignore because of lack of space. The
main complexity is the ambiguity about whether the relevant goals are those of the enacting
Congress (or legislative coalition, including possibly the President) or the current Congress
(and/or President) who, unlike the earlier principals, exert control over agencies. This important,
difficult problem justifies the independence of courts, and possibly of agencies as well, but lies
outside the scope of this Article.
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mine whether the project produces an outcome too far from its ideal
point. As long as the principal has the discretion to impose a sanction,
it need not discipline an agency that implements an inefficient project
that the principal likes. It can also discipline an agency that imple-
ments an efficient project that the principal does not like. In short,
cost-benefit analysis reveals information to the principal, and the
principal can use this information to punish agencies that deviate from
the principal's interests, whatever these interests happen to be.
If cost-benefit analysis is not cheap, it becomes a cruder though
still valuable instrument. Cost-benefit analysis serves as a blunt or
precise signal that distinguishes projects that agencies value a lot from
projects that agencies value less. Because the principal knows the loca-
tion of the agency's ideal point, it can use the signal to infer the loca-
tion of the status quo. This permits the principal in a range of cases to
sanction agencies that implement projects that do not make the prin-
cipal better off.
In still more complex cases, the principal is internally divided. The
President's interests differ from those of Congress, and members of
Congress may have conflicting interests as well. As conflict increases,
cost-benefit analysis loses its value, but so does any kind of delegation
to agencies." Given the normative premise that the principal-
Congress and the President, or some coalition-has goals that agen-
cies should implement, the model has nothing to say about cases in
which the principal is not unified." '
The principal relies on other mechanisms to control agencies.
Some of these mechanisms are substitutes for cost-benefit analysis
and others are complements. The President's ability to punish an
agency head enhances the value of cost-benefit analysis: the ability to
punish is more effective with full information than with partial infor-
mation. This argument applies as well to Congress's ability to strip
agencies of jurisdiction, reduce their budgets, and interfere with their
internal procedures. Lobbying by interest groups may be a substitute
for cost-benefit analysis, but only a partial substitute except in rare
cases where an interest group and the principal's interests are identi-
cal or nearly identical. But lobbying also distorts the political process.
134 McCubbins, 29 Am J Pol Sci at 738 (cited in note 83) (theorizing that an increasing
amount of conflict among legislators decreases the scope of agency discretion).
135 Although Pildes and Sunstein, 62 U Chi L Rev at 11-16 (cited in note 100), treat cost-
benefit analysis as an instrument for asserting executive power over the federal bureaucracy,
with the executive orders representing just the most recent moves in a long chess game between
the President and Congress, the truth is that cost-benefit analysis can also be an instrument of
congressional power, as recent legislative activity has shown. One can believe that requiring
agencies to use cost-benefit analysis is a good way of making agency behavior visible to elected
officials without taking a position on whether the elected officials charged with supervision of
agencies should be in the executive or legislative branch.
[68:11371188
Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis
Another virtue of cost-benefit analysis is that it reduces the ability of
interest groups to use their information advantages to influence politi-
cal outcomes.
There are also other standards that could be used in the place of
cost-benefit analysis. Risk-risk evaluation, for example, could play a
role similar to that of cost-benefit analysis. Their value relative to cost-
benefit analysis depends on (1) whether they measure relevant attrib-
utes of the environment more cheaply and accurately than cost-
benefit analysis, and (2) whether they are less manipulable than cost-
benefit analysis."
Finally, courts should enforce cost-benefit analysis when the prin-
cipal's goal is sufficiently close to efficiency, or the principal is suffi-
ciently anti-interventionist. When this is not true, cost-benefit analysis
retains its value as long as it is enforced only by political sanctions.
But even in this latter case courts can play a role in assessing the qual-
ity of cost-benefit analysis. The next section discusses this role.
Bringing these points together, cost-benefit analysis becomes a
more desirable instrument as:
(1) The agency's goals diverge from the principal's;
(2) The principal's goal approximates efficiency; or it is less inter-
ventionist, or not too much more interventionist, than effi-
ciency (if cost-benefit analysis is judicially enforced or if it
serves as a precise signal);
(3) The goals of components of the principal-the President,
members of Congress-converge;
(4) The regulated activity can be reliably monetized;"'
(5) The difficulty of monitoring the agency increases;
(6) The difficulty of sanctioning the agency or agency head de-
clines.
What should Congress direct agencies to do when these condi-
tions are not met? In some cases, the question is moot. If the agency
and the principal's goals converge (1), then oversight is unnecessary,
so neither cost-benefit analysis nor any alternative to cost-benefit
analysis is needed. If the goals of the principals diverge (3), then Con-
gress will not want to delegate much power to the agency. The same is
true if it is too difficult to monitor (5) or sanction (6) the agency.
136 See text accompanying note 107.
137 There are cases in which this is not so. Imagine, for example, that an agency is given the
authority to determine ethical constraints on medical research funded by the federal govern-
ment. Cost-benefit analysis cannot resolve such issues as the use of fetal tissue, because the un-
derlying controversy is moral, not welfarist. People's valuations in one direction are unlikely to
be relevant. See Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 243-45 (cited in note 26).
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Sometimes, the principal's goal is highly interventionist (2) or
perhaps just crazy. Several authors-including Judge Williams,' and
Kuran and Sunstein'39- defend judicially enforced cost-benefit analysis
on the grounds that it prevents agencies from implementing regula-
tions that accurately reflect public perceptions when public percep-
tions diverge from reality. The concern about public misperception of
risk also underlies Justice Breyer's proposal for centralized adminis-
trative machinery.'° The problem with this argument is that if elected
officials are responsive to public concerns, then agencies that refuse to
comply with laws that reflect these concerns will surely be socked with
heavy political and legal sanctions. Health regulations have always
been especially inefficient-in the sense of implicitly valuing statistical
lives far above the level that market data suggest-because they are
issued under statutes that demand inefficient health regulations.'
These statutes reflect dread for even small risks of cancer on the part
of a public that is comfortable with the high risks of automobile trans-
portation. If the public demands inefficient regulations, then there will
simply not be political support for cost-benefit analysis and no war-
rant for imposing it in the teeth of public opinion.
The most important case for departure from cost-benefit analysis
arises when cost-benefit analysis fails to capture the relevant effects of
the regulation because those effects cannot be monetized (4). This
problem arises when the effects are the subject of (1) disinterested
preferences or preferences for outcomes that are intrinsically difficult
142
to measure; (2) morally objectionable, such as sadistic, preferences;
or (3) adaptive preferences such as sour grapes; and (4) when the costs
and benefits of the regulation are not felt proportionately by rich and
poor.'3 In these cases Congress should require the agency to perform
and report a cost-benefit analysis but permit the agency to issue a
regulation that fails a cost-benefit test as long as the agency provides a
clear justification for violating the cost-benefit standard.
Agencies already depart from cost-benefit analysis although they
are rarely explicit about what they are doing. In violation of textbook
cost-benefit analysis, agencies routinely decline to adjust valuations of
life according to wealth, ignore preferences for illegal drugs, and re-
138 Stephen F. Williams, Squaring the Vicious Circle, 53 Admin L Rev 257,259 (2001).
139 Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan L
Rev 683,753 (1999).
140 Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (Harvard 1993). See also James Landis,
The Administrative Process (Greenwood 1974).
141 As observed initially by John F Morrall III, A Review of the Record, 10 Reg 25 (1986).
142 This would include discounting the valuations of future generations, on which see Rich-
ard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human
Lives, 99 Colum L Rev 941,987-1016 (1999).
143 See Adler and Posner, 29 J Legal Stud at 1108 (cited in note 9).
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fuse to consider racially biased projects.'" My proposal is that agencies
continue this practice but be more explicit and systematic. This pro-
posal is consistent with the Unfunded Mandates Act and the recent
bills proposed in Congress, which, as noted above, permit agencies to
issue inefficient regulations as long as they conduct a cost-benefit




B. The Role of Courts
This Article has emphasized the distinction between judicial en-
forcement of cost-benefit analysis and enforcement by the "govern-
ment," that is, the President or Congress. The President has the option
to sanction the agency whose project fails a cost-benefit analysis.'
Thus if the President likes such a project, the President does not have
to sanction the agency. By contrast, the court has no choice. If the law
directs it to vacate regulations that fail cost-benefit analysis, then it
cannot refrain when it sees that the project is attractive to the gov-
ernment. The mandatory nature of judicial enforcement weakens the
attractiveness of cost-benefit analysis when the government's ideal
point is not the same as efficiency. In addition, courts are generalists
and they are not in a good position to conduct their own cost-benefit
analyses in order to correct the agencies' analyses.
These problems suggest a subtler role for the court: not to en-
force cost-benefit analysis but to enhance its value as a signal. Recall
that in the signaling models, cost-benefit analysis becomes a more ef-
fective means for separating good projects from bad projects as the
signal becomes more precise. If cost-benefit analysis is a blunt signal-
that is, a cost that does not vary with the efficiency of the project-it
may have some value, but that value is limited. As cost-benefit analy-
sis becomes a more precise signal-that is, a cost that declines with the
efficiency of the project-it has increasing value, even if the principal's
ideal point is not efficiency, though it must be close. The court's pur-
pose should be to enhance the value of the cost-benefit signal for the
President and Congress, not to force agencies to issue only those regu-
lations that pass a cost-benefit analysis. Courts should try to raise the
difference between the cost of issuing a plausible cost-benefit analysis
of an efficient project and the cost of issuing a plausible cost-benefit
analysis of an inefficient project.
144 Id.
145 This is also similar to the National Environmental Policy Act, which requires agencies to
produce environmental impact statements for regulations that may harm the environment but
does not require the agencies to act in a particular way. See Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and
Its Reform 363-65 (Harvard 1982).
146 See Part II.E.
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This signal refinement heory has several implications. First, it is
not as important for courts to insist that agencies use the "right"
valuations for any given regulation as that they use consistent valua-
tions across regulations. For example, an agency should not be permit-
ted to value a statistical life at seven million dollars in one regulation
and then four million dollars in another, even though both valuations
are within the range of plausible valuation. The reason that courts
should not determine their own valuations is that they are insuffi-
ciently specialized. They should nonetheless demand consistency on
the part of agencies because the ability to change valuations opportu-
nistically lowers the cost of issuing a plausible cost-benefit analysis of
inefficient regulations. Courts should demand consistency within agen-
cies for all kinds of valuations, including items like discount rates. But
courts should not necessarily demand consistency across agencies.
Agencies may face authorizing statutes with different ideal points, re-
flecting different public policy concerns.147 If, as it appears, Congress
demands stricter regulation of carcinogenic substances than other
health and safety hazards, and thus agencies implementing the cancer
regulations assume higher valuations of life, it is not-on the norma-
tive assumption that the principal's goals are fundamental-the role
of the court to demand consistency, though Congress's decision may
be wrong."
Second, when costs and benefits are not readily monetizable-
and this includes the value of environmental amenities-courts should
not necessarily demand that agencies monetize them. The problem is
that a monetized valuation may be arbitrary.' But courts can never-
theless improve the signal by demanding quantification if possible (for
example, the use of life years), and a reasoned, non-boilerplate discus-
sion of why the valuation cannot be quantified. The court can also
demand that the agency conduct surveys of people's views about a
proposed project.
Third, courts should take account of the ideal point of the agency.
The farther the agency is from the ideal point of the winning coalition
(which may or may not be equivalent to efficiency), the stricter the
demands the court should make on the agency. It should be more will-
ing to vacate a regulation issued by an extreme agency than a regula-
tion issued by a moderate agency.150
147 Agencies should be permitted to change valuations only when they can point to relevant
research or legislation that was issued after the last regulation.
148 See Part IV.C.
149 See Adler and Posner, 29 J Legal Stud at 1116-20 (cited in note 9).
150 See, for example, Matt Spitzer and Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J Legal Stud 679,
679-80 (2000) (concluding that courts scrutinize more where a stronger ideological gap is pre-
sent).
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Fourth, courts should take account of the ability of the political
branches to sanction the agency. As the ideal points of the political
branches converge, and as they become more distant from that of the
agency, the court should be more willing to approve a regulation, even
one in which the cost-benefit analysis is of low quality. The reason is
that the political branches, which have better information than the
court about their own ideal points, are in a better position to discipline
the agency.5 '
Fifth, courts should be less willing to enforce cost-benefit analysis
in the absence of statutory authorization, and the more that the win-
ning coalition's ideal point deviates from efficiency. Put differently, the
winning coalition's valuations-for example, a higher than current
valuation of life- should be permitted to inform the cost-benefit
analysis. This requirement boils down to an injunction against forcing
cost-benefit analysis onto Congress when it has non-efficiency goals.
C. Cases on Cost-Benefit Analysis
The cases illustrate some of these ideas. In Public Citizen v
Young,' the court vacated the FDA's determination that some cancer-
causing color additives may be used in food and drugs." ' Normal con-
sumption of the additives in question posed a smaller cancer risk than
eating a single peanut or spending seventeen hours in Denver rather
than Washington, D.C.4 Although the statute prohibited use of addi-
tives that pose any cancer risk, the FDA reasoned that there must be
an implicit de minimis exemption. If not, and these additives were
prohibited, manufacturers might switch to noncarcinogenic additives
that pose a higher risk to health-as only carcinogenic additives were
covered by the statute.'55
The court vacated the FDA's decision even though, as the court
appeared to believe, it would surely have passed a cost-benefit test.
The court argued that the legislative history and the absolute language
in the statute indicated that Congress was responding to public hys-
teria about cancer, and was trying to show that it was responsive to the
public's fears." Congress sought more interventionist regulation than
efficiency (narrowly conceived) demanded.'
151 The third and fourth implications are subject to a complication, which is whether the
court should consider the existing Congress or the original coalition.
152 831 F2d 1108 (DC Cir 1987).
153 Id at 1122-23.
154 Id at 1111.
155 Id at 1113.
156 Id at 1113-19.
157 By contrast, when Congress was less clear about its goals, a court permitted the agency
to consider the costs and benefits of the regulation. See NRDC v EPA, 824 F2d 1146, 1163 (DC
Cir 1987) (en banc) (concluding the EPA could consider cost and benefit factors because clear
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This case is consistent with the fifth implication discussed above,
that courts should not force Congress to adopt efficiency as a stan-
dard. A statute that increases noncancer deaths more than it reduces
cancer deaths is prima facie inefficient. Although it may be that calm-
ing public fears or showing concern for public fears should count as a
benefit that outweighs the costs of the statute, it is doubtful that an
ordinary cost-benefit analysis would measure these advantages. But it
is not the role of courts to strike down statutes because they are inef-
ficient or appear inefficient because of intangibles, and thus it cannot
be their role to vacate regulations that properly implement such stat-
utes. If the signal refinement view is correct, the court vacates ineffi-
cient regulations only when (1) the statute permits cost-benefit analy-
sis, and (2) the cost-benefit analysis was badly performed. In Young
the first condition was not met.
In International Union, UAW v OSHA,' the court held that the
Occupational Safety and Health Act's vague guidance to OSHA-
which required OSHA to adopt "the standard which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible,.., that no employee will suffer material
impairment of health or functional capacity"'59- did not permit OSHA
to adopt "feasibility" alone as a sufficient condition for issuing a regu-
lation, and it struck down a regulation promulgated under this stan-
dard.'6°The court encouraged OSHA to use a cost-benefit standard in-
stead."' In this case and other cases as well, courts adopt cost-benefit
analysis as a default standard that agencies may use, and perhaps
should use when the statute is ambiguous.' The cases can be read as
warnings to agencies that if they do not use cost-benefit analysis, their
regulation is subject to remand for further explanation. If they do use
it, they are in a safe harbor and may expect that their regulation will
survive a challenge if the cost-benefit justification is plausible. Interna-
tional Union and the other cases are consistent with the blunt signal
version of cost-benefit analysis: they force agencies to incur the ex-
pense of cost-benefit analysis or a similar procedure.
congressional intent was lacking). It is straightforward that an alternative result would interfere
with using cost-benefit analysis as a signal in this context.
158 938 F2d 1310 (DC Cir 1991).
159 Id at 1313.
160 Id at 1325-26.
161 Id at 1321. The court held that other standards may be permissible as well, but identified
only cost-benefit analysis as a possibility, and described at some length what cost-benefit analysis
entails. After remand, the D.C. Circuit took up the issue of OSHA's new regulations, which did
not involve cost-benefit analysis, and found that they were sufficient to avoid nondelegation
problems See International Union, UAW v OSHA, 37 F3d 665,668-71 (DC Cir 1994).
162 See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles at 18-32 (cited in note 6); Michigan v EPA,
213 F3d 663, 678-79 (DC Cir 2000) (stating that the "preclusion of cost consideration requires a
rather express congressional direction").
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Other cases go farther and describe what counts as good and bad
practice in calculating costs and benefits. These cases are consistent
with the precise signal version of cost-benefit analysis, for they in-
crease the cost of manipulating data in order to make an inefficient
regulation appear cost-justified. The most striking example of such a
case is Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA,6 which vacated a regulation of
asbestos products."' The court criticized EPA's cost-benefit analysis
for:
(1) Discounting only the costs of the regulation and not the bene-
fits;
165
(2) Discounting from the time of exposure rather than from the
time of injury;'66
(3) Calculating costs and benefits over a short period (thirteen
years) rather than the life of the regulation;67
(4) Treating lives saved beyond the thirteen year period as "un-
quantified benefits" that outweigh the expected costs of the
regulation;'1
(5) Using an unreasonably high valuation for life (forty-three to
seventy-six million dollars per life saved)'69. compared to the
valuations used in other regulations;70
(6) Double-counting factors by including them in the cost-benefit
analysis and using them as a separate reason for regulation;'
(7) Failing to take account of the risks of technologies to which
industry would substitute as a result of the regulation;.7 and
(8) Assuming that errors identified by opponents of the regula-
tion balance out, rather than performing a new cost-benefit
analysis using the improved data. 173
The court does not perform its own cost-benefit analysis and then
use the results of this analysis to evaluate the agency's action. Indeed,
the court gives EPA a great deal of discretion. But it places limits on
that discretion. EPA may choose among different valuations of life,
but it may not use a valuation that is significantly higher than those
163 947 F2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991).
164 Id at 1229-30.
165 Id at 1218.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id at 1219.
169 Id.
170 Id at 1223.
171 Id at 1219.
172 Id at 1221. See also Competitive Enterprise Institute v NHTSA, 956 F2d 321,326-27 (DC
Cir 1992) (requiring NHTSA, in evaluating whether continued high fuel standards are justified,
to take account of cost in lives lost if consumers switched to smaller cars).
173 Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F2d at 1227.
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calculated by economists or used in other regulations.4 It may choose
a discount rate, but it must be within a plausible range,' and the
agency may not selectively discount some items and not others--for
example, costs and not benefits. The EPA may use unquantifiable
benefits as a tie breaker when monetized costs and benefits are close,
but it may not use them to justify regulations that clearly fail the
monetized test. 6 It must use the best available data; must look at all
relevant costs and benefits; must look at the relevant time period;
must discount the relevant factors (injury not exposure); and it must
not double-count.7 All of these requirements are good practice, but
they leave the agency substantial discretion to determine valuations.
The result is a signal that is not blunt but relatively precise. After Cor-
rosion Proof Fittings, it is harder for an agency to fake a cost-benefit
justification of a regulation.
The signal refinement view that courts should be more concerned
about accurate information disclosure than about the efficiency of
regulations is further supported by Competitive Enterprise Institute v
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration." The court in that
case was bothered that the NHTSA refused to take account of the risk
to life that would result if the NHTSA's automobile mileage regula-
tions forced customers to switch to smaller cars. The court may have
been willing to approve a regulation that imposed such a risk. The
point was to force that cost out into the open, so that the political
branches may respond if necessary.9
Cost-benefit analysis is not the only way for an agency to send a
signal. As argued above, a procedure that quantifies the advantages
and disadvantages of regulations may constrain agencies, and thus
serves at least as a blunt, and perhaps as a precise, signal. In American
Trucking Associations, Inc v EPA, the D.C. Circuit struck down the
EPA's particulate matter rule because it was not accompanied by a
plausible justification.'O Barred by its own precedent from demanding
that the EPA use cost-benefit analysis, the court suggested that the
EPA use quality adjusted life years or a similar standard to evaluate
the regulation, but if no such standard were available, then the statute
would be an unconstitutional delegation. The Supreme Court subse-
174 But see American Dental Association v Martin, 984 F2d 823, 825-26 (7th Cir 1993) (up-
holding OSHA's bloodborne pathogens rule and noting that the valuation for life saved of four
million dollars was reasonable).
175 Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F2d at 1218 n 19.
176 Id at 1219.
177 Compare American Dental Association, 984 F2d at 826, which was more tolerant of the
agency's failure to consider some costs.
178 956 F2d 321,324-25 (DC Cir 1992).
179 Id.
180 175 F3d at 1053-55.
[68:11371196
Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis
quently rejected the constitutional analysis, but for present purposes
what is interesting about the Circuit Court's opinion is its attempt to
compel the EPA to reveal information about the effects of the regula-
tion. If the Court could not overturn the regulation on efficiency
grounds, it could at least by compelling disclosure of the regulation's
health effects make the EPA vulnerable to sanctions from the political
branches.
The discussion so far supports the first two claims about judicial
review of cost-benefit analysis, and also the fifth, but says nothing
about the third and fourth, according to which courts should take ac-
count of the ideal point of the agency and the extent to which the po-
litical branches are divided. Courts are rarely candid about these mat-
ters, and the only way to determine whether these claims are true is to
conduct a statistical study of the distribution of case outcomes.8' One
predicts, for example, that courts are more likely to strike down regu-
lations issued by agencies that have an interventionist or deregulatory
reputation than regulations issued by other agencies; and that courts
are more likely to strike down regulations when the political branches
are ideologically divided. Testing this prediction will have to wait for
future work.
CONCLUSION
Many of the philosophical difficulties with cost-benefit analysis
disappear when a principal-agent perspective is taken. It is not neces-
sary to adjudicate among rival normative theories of the proper role
of government in order to determine whether agencies should use
cost-benefit analysis. The only important normative assumption is that
elected officials should have the power to set policy, not the agency.
The justification for cost-benefit analysis also depends on empiri-
cal assumptions about (1) how easy it is to manipulate cost-benefit
data; (2) how effectively government principals can discipline agen-
cies; and (3) how far cost-benefit analysis results will usually be from
President's and Congress's goals if courts are supposed to enforce
them.
These assumptions are innocuous in ordinary circumstances.
Regarding the first assumption, it is not usually easy to manipulate
cost-benefit data. Except when the regulation depends to an unusual
extent on hard-to-measure variables, the cost-benefit analysis will pro-
181 Compare Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from
Administrative Law, 31 J Legal Stud (forthcoming 2002); Revesz, 83 Va L Rev at 1717 (cited in
note 70). Both of these studies-and there are many others in the political science literature-
attempt to show through the distribution of case outcomes and modes of review that judges are
influenced by political goals.
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duce useful information for the government principals, and even when
the regulation depends on these variables, cost-benefit analysis may
be valuable as long as it is costly to perform. The agency's willingness
to incur the cost, if it is high enough, gives the principals information
about the location of the status quo.
The second assumption seems reasonable because the principals
have a variety of tools for disciplining agencies, and the evidence sug-
gests that these tools are effective. The third assumption is necessary
only when the courts are given the authority to enforce cost-benefit
analyses. But the courts are not always necessary, and indeed I have
argued that their proper use may be ensuring that the cost-benefit
procedure is performed accurately, not that a regulation is cost-
justified. When the principals can discipline agencies, they can prevent
agencies from implementing regulations that are efficient but that are
too far from their ideal points. When the principals seek regulations
that are inefficient, they can simply write into the statute that the
agency must perform a cost-benefit analysis, or similar information-
generating procedure, but need not follow it. This was the command of
the 1999 Senate bill. That bill required courts to ensure that the cost-
benefit analysis is adequately performed but did not authorize them
to vacate a regulation that fails it.
This Article observed that cost-benefit analysis reduces the influ-
ence of interest groups on regulations. When cost-benefit analysis re-
veals information for which the principals would otherwise have to
rely on interest groups, the interest groups lose a source of their
power. This is surely a desirable feature of cost-benefit analysis, except
in the theoretically possible, but implausible, case in which interest
groups provide information significantly more cheaply and accurately
than cost-benefit analysis does, and over a wide enough range of pro-
jects.
There is a contrary view, however. Suppose that one believes that
Congress and the President are motivated solely or mainly by a desire
to transfer resources to interest groups, but are partially checked by
the taxpayers' ability to retaliate at the polls. If cost-benefit analysis
enhances Congress's and the President's control over agencies but
does not enhance the public's control over the government, then this
more efficient monitoring instrument should lead not only to more
regulation (as suggested earlier) but to more regulation that transfers
resources from citizens to interest groups. Conservatives who take
182 Compare Becker and Mulligan's argument that increases in the efficiency of tax and
spending instruments lead to an increase in the size of the government. See generally Gary S.
Becker and Casey B. Mulligan, Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government, George J. Stigler
Center for the Study of the Economy and the State Working Paper No 144 (Nov 1998). See also
Becker and Mulligan, Accounting for the Growth of Government (cited in note 120), where they
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this view should not support cost-benefit analysis. They should oppose
cost-benefit analysis because it will lead to an increase in the amount
of regulation and a reduction in the welfare of citizens.
Finally, we should emphasize that cost-benefit analysis makes
agencies better off as well as the principals, and this should surprise
the critics of cost-benefit analysis. The EPA, for example, benefits
from cost-benefit analysis because otherwise principals should trust
this agency less, and be unwilling to give it funds, jurisdiction, remedial
power, and other needed resources. Accordingly, citizens and interest
groups who want to strengthen the EPA ought to support cost-benefit
analysis rather than criticize it. If they are unhappy with regulations
that are issued, their real target should not be cost-benefit analysis,
which is merely a tool for monitoring the agencies, but the goals of the
President and Congress and the public that elects them. Given suffi-
cient hostility toward environmental regulation among these princi-
pals, reducing their ability to monitor the EPA is likely to lead them to
undermine that agency in other ways. The better strategy is to require
the EPA to use cost-benefit analysis.
These last comments reverse the conventional wisdom about
the politics of cost-benefit analysis. If cost-benefit analysis works the
way it is supposed to, liberals should favor cost-benefit analysis and
conservatives should oppose it.
consider regulation as well, but not cost-benefit analysis.
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